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THE LIBERATION OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES:
UNION SECURITY IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
A. L. ZWERDLING*
INTRODUCTION
Recent years have witnessed a marked rise in the number of
public employees' and an even faster growth in public employee union
membership.' At the same time, public employees have intensified
their demand for rights won long ago by private sector workers: the
right to organize and act collectively through employee organizations
of their own choosing; the right to have the employee organization
recognized as the exclusive bargaining representative; and the right to
bargain collectively as to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment. 3 While there is no uniform national legislation with
respect to public employees, 4 the current trend is toward full recogni-
tion of these rights by state governments' and at least limited recogni-
*B.A., j.D., University of Michigan; Partner, Zwerdling and Maurer; General
Counsel, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-C10
(AFSCME). The Responsibility for the views expressed herein is that of the author
alone. Credit for a considerable amount of the work done on this article should go to
Burt Boltuch, my able, former law clerk.
' In the last twenty years the number of federal, state and local government em-
ployees has more than doubled. U.S. BUREAU OF 'EMI CENSUS. DEPT or COMMERCE.
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 433 (94th ed. 1973). There were 15.0
million civilian public employees in October, 1975, an increase of 358,000 over October,
1974. Of these, 12.1 million were nonfederal and 2.9 million were federal employees.
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS. DEPT OF COMMERCE, REPORT OF JULY, 1976 reported at
GOV'T BIM. REL. REP. (BNA), § 71 at 2111 (Reference File).
' According to the Bureau of the Census, employees of state and local govern-
ments are joining unions in record numbers. Fifty-one percent of the full-time nonfed-
eral public employees in the country are now union members. Only 41 percent were
members 1972. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEPT OF COMMERCE, SPECIAL STUDIES NO.
75, LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: 1974 . (1976),
reported at 1976 Gowr EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA), No. 648, B-21. Union membership in the
federal sector also accelerated in 1975. 1976 Gorr Emil.. REL: REP. (BNA), No. 645,
A-9.
3 Most private sector employees have been protected by federal legislation since
the enactment of the National Labor Relations Act in 1935 and the Railway Labor Act
in 1926. National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 et seq. (1935), as amended 29 U.S.C.
§§ 141-87 (1970), as amended (Supp. V 1975). Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577 el seq.
(1926), as amended 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1970).
' Section 2(2) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (Supp. V 1975), specifi-
cally excludes government employers and thus their employees from coverage under
the Act.
5 At the state level, at least 29 states have enacted statutes that recognize public
sector collective bargaining and other fundamental rights for state and local employees.
The recognition varies as to the categories of public employees covered and the rights
guaranteed.
Eighteen states have a comprehensive, full scope law or laws mandating collective
bargaining for state and local government employees. 'See Conn. Pub. Acts No. 75.566, §§
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tion of these rights by the Federal government." As more and more
jurisdictions move in this direction, attention is now being focused on
union security, which is an agreement between a union and an
1-12 Wily 7, 1975) (state employees), CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §4 7-467 to -477 (1972), as
amended (Supp. 1976) (local employees); FLA. STAT. §4 447.201 to .607 (Supp. 1975-76);
HAWAII REV. STAT.** 89-I to -21 (Supp. 1975); low* CODE ANN.** 20.1-.27 (Supp.
1976); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §4 979 to 979-0 (1974), as amended (Supp. 1975-76)
(state employees), It 'tit. 26 4* 961-73 (1974), as amended (Supp. 1975-76) (local em-
ployees), id. tit. 26 ** 1021-1034 (Supp. 1975-76) (University of Maine employees; effec-
tive July I, 1976); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 150E. ** 1-15 (1976) (West); MICH. COMP.
LAws ANN. §4 423.201 to .216 (1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. §4 179.61-.76 (Supp. 1976)
(West); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §4 59-1601 to -1617 (Supp. 1975); NEB. REV. STAT.**
48-801 to -823 (1974); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §4 273-A:1 to -A:16 (Supp. 1975); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §4 34:13A-I to -11 (Supp. 1976-77) (West); N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW (consul) §4
200-14 (McKinney 1973), as amended (Supp. 1975-76); ORE. REV. STAT. §¢ 243.650,782
(1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §4 1101.101,2301 (Supp. 1976-77); R.I. Gen. Laws §4
36-11-1 to -11-11 (Supp. 1975) (state employees), R.I. GEN LAWS §§ 28-09.4-1 to -9.4-19
(1969) (local employees); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §4 3-18-1 to -17 (1974), as amended
(Supp. 1976); WIS. STAT. ANN. §4 111.80-.97 (1974) (West) (state employees), id. §4
111.70-.77 (1974) (municipal employees). Indiana's full scope public sector collective
bargaining law, IND. CODE ANN. §§ 22-6-4 to 22-6-13 (Supp. 1976) (Burns), was held un-
constitutional by a state court in Community School Corp. v. Indiana Educ. Employ-
ment Rel. Bd., 91 L.R.R.M. 2521 (Ind. Cir. Ct. 1976). The law contains a provision
prohibiting judicial review of the state board's bargaining unit determinations. IND.
CODE ANN. § 22-6-4-8 (Supp. 1976) (Burns). This provision was held to be a violation of
the due process guarantee of Art. I, § 12 of the Indiana Constitution. Since the uncon-
stitutional provisions were viewed as an integral part of the statute, the court held that
the entire statute was void. 91 L.R.R.M. at 2523.
One state has a' comprehensive, full scope law mandating collective bargaining
for state employees, see ALASKA STAT. §4 23.40.070 to -.260 (1972), while allowing local
governments to opt out of coverage, ALASKA STAT., Temporary and Special Acts of
1972* 9, ch. 113.
Four states have comprehensive laws mandating collective bargaining for local
government employees. See NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 288.010-.280 (1973); OELA. STAT. ANN.
tit. I I, §§ 548.1-.14 (Supp. 1975-76) (West); VT. S'rAT. ANN. tit. 21, *4 1501-1623 (Supp.
1975); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §4 41.56.020 to .56.950 (1972) as amended (Supp. 1975),
id. §4 288.52.010 to .52.200 (Supp. 1975) (community college employees), id. if
41.59.010 to .59.950 (Supp. 1975) (public school employees).
Two states have authorized a limited form of collective bargaining for state gov-
ernment employees. See DEL CODE tit. 19, §4 1301-12 (1974); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§
41.06.070 to .06.340 (1972), as amended (Supp. 1975) (state civil service employees), id.
ta* 288.16.010 to .16.230 (1972), as amended (Supp. 1975) (state higher education per-
sonnel). The Delaware law has a provision for coverage of local government employees if
the local governing bodies opt for coverage. DEL. CODE tit. 19, § 1301(a)(3) (1974).
Three states have mandatory meet and confer laws coveting state and local gov-
ernment employees. The laws of California and Kansas are relatively comprehensive,
whereas the Missouri law is not. See CAL. Gov -r CODE §4 3525-36 (1966), as amended
(Supp. 1976) (West) (state employees), id. §4 3500-09 (1966), as amended (Supp. 1976)
(local employees), id. §§ 3540-49 (Supp. 1976) (West) (public school employees); KAN.
S'I'A'r. §§ 75-4321 to -4337 (Supp. 1975) (state employees covered; local employees cov-
ered, if local government opts for coverage, id. 75-432l(c); Mo. REV. STAT. §4
105.500-.530 (1966), as amended (Supp. 1976).
6 0n the federal level, Exec. Order No, 11,491, 3 C.F.R. 861 (Supp. 1966-70), as
amended by Exec. Order No. 11,838, 3A C.F.R. 126 (1975), which were issued pursuant
to authority granted to the President by 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1970), guarantees federal em-
ployees in the executive branch the right to bargain collectively within narrow limits.
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employer' requiring employees, as a condition of continued employ-
ment, either to join the union or pay a set amount to the union.°
Attention has been drawn to union security agreements because
of their conflicting significance for unions, non-union member em-
ployees, and employers. To the union, union security agreements
mean that its financial stability is insured, at least for the duration of
the collective bargaining agreement. To the non-union member em-
ployee, union security agreements mean that he must contribute to
the financial stability of an organization with members, policies, and
ideals which he may abhor. To the employer opposed to unions in
general" or opposed to the union currently representing his
employees,'° union security agreements mean that the strength of the
unwanted union will be increased. To the employer not opposed to
unionization, union security agreements mean that labor peace will be
increased because of the union's financial stability."
The public sector has provided a particularly Fertile area for
challenging the validity of union security agreements for two reasons.
First, in the public sector, unlike the private sector," there is no fed-
eral law authorizing the collection of union security fees. Conse-
quently, non-union member employees and employers have attacked
the statutory and common law authority of governmental units to
enter into union security agreements." Second, in the public sector,
7 Union security can be mandated by law, but more frequently it is a negotiated
clause in the collective bargaining agreement. See notes and text at notes 76-103 intro.
" Union security arrangments are not a recent innovation in public employment.
Studies in 1943, 1949 and 1955 discovered a significant number of union shops or
modified union shops in various municipal collective bargaining agreements. More re-
cent data in 1970 showed that over 43% of 700 AFSCME contracts contained union
security provisions. DEFT OF LABOR, OFFICE OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT POLICY
DEVELOPMENT. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT, AND THE MERIT SYSTEM
98-100, 114 (1972) [hereinafter cited as DOL).
The National Right to Work Committee [hereinafter referred to as the
Committee], which has been in existence for over twenty years, is the leading propo-
nent in a long succession of employer-funded groups dedicated to opposing union se-
curity and the labor movement. See generally CROUP RESEARCH. INC., THE NATIONAL
RIGHT TO WORK COMMFITEE I, 3-7 (1962). In 1968, the Committee created a litigating
arm, the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, Inc. with a board of direc-
tors nearly identical to that of the Committee.
10 An employer, for example, may prefer to have his employees represented by
an independent.union, rather than one associated with . an international organization,
because the independent union would not have the international's resources at its dis-
posal. Also, the officials of an independent union might well be the employer's own
employees.
" A lack of financial stability undermines meaningful collective bargaining by en-
couraging greater hostility between the union and the employer. The union's hostility
toward the employer is aimed at attracting more financial support from nonmember
employees; while the employer's hostility toward the union is motivated by the desire to
obtain more favorable agreements from the financially strapped union. See generally
Blair, Union Security Agreements in Public Employment, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 183, 189-90
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Blair].
" See National Labor Relations Act, § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(3) (1970).
"See notes and text at notes 122-95 infra.
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unlike the private sector, the collective bargaining activities of unions
are often necessarily political in nature." As a result, non-union
member employees, with the support of employers, have claimed that
even if the collection of service fees is valid, the use of such fees for
political purposes violates the dissenter's constitutional rights.'5
The first section of this article will consider the developing rights
of public employees—the right to join unions, the right to exclusive
recognition, and the right to fair representation. The article will then
analyze union security provisions in the public sector. The various
forms of these provisions, as well as the need for, and validity of pub-
lic sector union security agreements will be examined. On the basis of
this examination it will be submitted that union security agreements
are vital to the stability of public sector unions and that such agree-
ments, provided they contain protection for the rights of non-union
member employees and union member dissenters, are valid.
1. THE DEVELOPING RIGHTS OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
Until recently, state and municipal governments had either re-
fused or been reluctant to accept public employee organizations."
. This resistance arose primarily from policy considerations based on
the concepts of sovereignty, illegal delegation of authority, and the
public interest. The sovereignty argument stemmed from the notion
that the government, as the repository of supreme power, could not
tolerate the decrease in power that was certain to result if unioniza-
tion and collective bargaining were permitted." The illegal delegation
theory was premised on constitutional, statutory, and common law re-
quirements that certain decisions be made by government officials.
According to this theory, collective bargaining results in shared
decision-making between employers and employees on issues such as
wages, hours, and conditions of employment. Since in the public sec-
tor such decisions have traditionally been made by-executive and legis-
" See notes and text at notes 196-208 infra.
"See notes and text at notes 242-57 infra.
"See generally K. HANSLOWE, THE EMERGING LAW Or LABOR RELATIONS IN PUBLIC
EMPLOYMENT 11-33 (1967); NIGRO, MANAGEMENT-EMPLOYEE RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC
SERVICE 26-29 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Nick()); Spero, Collective Bargaining in Public
Employment: Form and Scope, 22 PUB. AD. REV. I (1962); Wellington & Winter, The Limits
of Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, 78 YALE L. J. 1107 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as Wellington & Winter].
An example of this reasoning can be found in Perez v. Board of Police
Comm'rs, 78 Cal. App. 2d 638, 178 P.2d 537, 19 L.R.R.M. 2518 (1947). In upholding a
resolution barring police officers from joining labor unions, the court stated: "The fail-
ure to [enforce the resolution] would have amounted to a surrender of power, a dere-
liction of duty, and a relinquishment of supervision and control over public servants
...." Id. at 651, 178 P.2d at 545, 19 L.R.R.M. at 2524. The sovereignty argument was
supported by the experience in the private sector where unionization and collective
bargaining had resulted in an increase in the power of the employees and a corres-
ponding decrease in the power of the employers. See Wellington & Winter, supra note
16, at 1108-09.
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lative bodies, collective bargaining would be an illegal delegation of
these governmental functions.'" The public interest objection to public
sector unionization was founded upon the view that employee organi-
zations would inevitably make demands, such as increased wages, that
were inconsistent with community interests such as lower taxes."
More and more jurisdictions, however, are now enacting statutes
authorizing public sector unionization and collective bargaining."
This change in position has been motivated, in part, by the declining
persuasiveness of the concepts of sovereignty and delegation, 2 ' and by
the realization that the public interest, in addition to being difficult to
define, 22 may in fact be served by the labor stability that follows union
recognition and collective bargaining. As public employees have
turned to dealing collectively with employers, the result has been
more than higher wages, shorter hours, and better working
conditions, 23 for in addition to such tangible economic benefits, collec-
tive bargaining has resulted in the recognition of the right of public
employees to join unions, the right of public employees to have their
unions recognized as exclusive bargaining representatives, and the
right of non-union member public employees to fair representation by
" The theory was expressed in Railway Mail Ass'n v. Murphy, 180 Misc. 868,
875, 44 N.Y.S.2d 601, 607 (Sup. Ct. 1943), rend on other grounds sub nom., Railway Mail
Ass'n v. Corsi, 267 App. Div. 470, affd, 293 N.Y. 315, 56 N.E.2d 721, affd, 326 U.S. 88
(1945), in the following terms:
To tolerate or recognize any combination of civil service employees of the
government as a labor organization or union is ... inconsistent with every
principle upon which our government is founded.... To admit as true
that government employees have the power to halt or check the functions
of government unless their demands are satisfied, is to transfer to them all
legislative, executive and judicial power.
See Wellington & Winter, .supra note 16, at 1109-11.
'See Metro, supra note 16, at 29.30.
20 See note 5 sulna. Although state laws vary as to coverage, the trend is toward
enacting comprehensive statutes. The Advisory Commission of Intergovernmental Rela-
tions recommended that all states enact legislation requiring state and local govern-
ments to recognize the right of their employees to join and be represented by unions.
A ',mom' COMMISSION ON INTER-GOVERNMENTAL. RELATIONS, LABOR MANAGEMENT
POLICIES FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 93 (1969) [hereinafter cited as ACIR].
2 ' See Wellington & Winter, supra note 16, at 1115-1117. See generally, K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT §§ 2.01-.10, 27.01-07 (1972).
"See NIGRO,SUpra note 16, at 29-30.
" The broader and noneconomic significance of public sector collective bargain-
ing has been described by Jerry Wurf, International President of AFSCME:
Collective bargaining is more than simply an additional holiday, or a
pay increase, or an improved pension plan, or a grievance procedure. It is,
of course, all of these, and their importance can hardly be overestimated.
But it is, in its most profound sense, a process.
It is a process which transforms pleading to negotiation. It is a pro-
cess which permits employees dignity as they participate in the formulation
of their terms and conditions of employment. It is a process which em-
braces the democratic ideal and applies it concretely, specifically, effec-
tively, at the work place.
Address by Jerry Wurf, International President, AFSCME, 1967 U.S. Conference of
Mayors, Honolulu, Hawaii, quoted in ACIR, supra note 20, at 51.
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such exclusive bargaining representatives. Without such rights, the
immediate economic benefits obtained through collective bargaining
might well be short-lived.
A. Right To Join
Until the early 1960's, the courts held with near unanimity that
public employees did not have a constitutional right to join or form
unions24 and, as a corollary, that legislatures could specifically forbid
the joining or forming of unions. 25 The 1947 discussion of the
California Court of Appeals in Perez it Board of Police" exemplifies
the rationale utilized by courts in denying public employees the right
to join or form unions. In Perez, policemen alleged that a city resolu-
tion which prohibited them from joining or forming labor organiza-
tions thereby violated their constitutional rights to equal protection,
freedom of speech, peaceable assembly, petition for redress of griev-
ances, and due process. 27 The court rejected the claims, finding that
the conditions of public employment, including the ability to join and
form labor unions, were established by the people indirectly through
government agencies and were necessary to advance the "public
good."28 Consequently, even when such conditions required the "sur-
render of certain liberties," there could be no "conflict with the will of
the people as expressed in the Federal Constitution!" 2 o
More recently, courts in both federal and state jurisdictions have
struck down restrictions upon the right of public employees to join
unions. In the landmark case of McLaughlin v. Tilendis" the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the dismissal
of two teachers for their affiliation with the American Federation of
Teachers violated the first amendment to the United States
Constitution. 3 ' The district court had dismissed the complaint using
"E.g., King v. Priest, 357 Mo. 68, 206 S.W.2d 547 (1947), appeal dismissed, 333
U.S. 852, rehearing denied, 333 U.S. 878 (1948); Caner v. Thompson, 164 Va. 312, 180
Si. 410 (1935); Fursman v. Chicago, 278 III. 318, 116 N.E. 158 (1917).
25 For example, in 1963, the Michigan Supreme Court in Local 201, AFSCME v.
City of Muskegon, 369 Mich, 384, 120 N.W.2d 197; 52 L.R.R.M. 2710, cert. denied, 375
U.S. 833 (1963), upheld the constitutionality of a rule promulgated by the local chief of
police barring city police officers from becoming members in any organization iden-
tified with any federation or labor union that admits persons who are not members of
the city's police force. Id. at 389-90, 396-98, 120 N.W.2d at 199, 202-03, 52 L.R.R.M. at
2711, 2714. Cf. Mugford v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 14 L.R.R.M. 732, 734
(Md. Dist. Ct.), affd, 15 L.R.R.M. 646 (Md. Cir. Ct. 1944). See Shaw, The Development of
State and Federal Laws, in PUBLIC WORKERS AND PUBLIC UNIONS 21 (S. Zagoria ed. 1972).
" 78 Cal. App. 2d 638, 178 P.2d 537, 19 L.R.R.M. 2518 (1947).
" Id. at 642, 178 P.2d at 540, 19 L.R.R.M. at 2519.
"Id. at 645, 178 P.2d at 545-46, 19 L.R.R.M. at 2524-25.
"Id. -
" 398 F.2d 287, 71 L.R.R.M. 2097 (7th Cir. 1968).
21 Id. at 288-89, 71 L.R.R.M. at 2098-99. The first amendment was applied to the
state through the fourteenth amendment. Id.
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reasoning similar to that developed in Perez. 32 The court of appeals,
in rejecting this rationale, found that the teachers' first amendment
rights to freedom of association 33 and freedom of speech 34 were in-
fringed by the dismissal. The possibility that the union might in the
future hurt the public interest by engaging in strikes did not justify
violating the teachers' first amendment rights by prohibiting mere
membership in the organization. 35 Other courts have extended the
McLaughlin rationale to other classes of public employees, 36 and have
struck down statutes which prohibited all or certain categories of pub-
lic employees from joining or forming unions. 37
13. Right to Exclusive Recognition
Legal status—the recognition of the constitutional right to join
or form public employee unions—does not in itself mean that public
employee unions will be effective. Unions need the further right to
deal exclusively with their members' employers, for without such a
right, employers are able to reach separate agreements with dissident
individual employees or groups of employees. Consequently, an em-
ployer might be encouraged to reject a union's reasonable proposals
and reach agreements apart from the union in order to undermine
the union's strength. 38 The doctrine of exclusive recognition requires
32 The court of appeals quoted the district court as finding that:
The union may decide to engage in strikes, to set up machinery to bargain
with the governmental employer, to provide machinery for arbitration, or
may seek to establish working conditions. Overriding community interests
are involved. The very ability of the governmental entity to Function may
be affected. The judiciary, and particularly this Court, cannot interfere
with the power or discretion of the state in handling these matters.
Id. at 289, 71 L.R.R.M. at 2099.
33 Id. at 288, 71 L.R.R.M. at 2098, citing Sheton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
34 398 F.2d at 289, 71 L.R.R.M. at 2099, citing Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391
U.S. 563 (1968).
3° 398 F.2d at 289-90, 71 L.R.R.M. at 2099.
36 See, e.g., Lontine v. Van Cleave, 483 F.2d 966, 967-68, 84 L.R.R.M. 2445, 2446
(10th Cir. 1973) (deputy sheriff); AFSCME v. Woodward, 406 F.2d 137, 139, 70
L.R.R.M. 2317, 2318 (8th Cir. 1969) (street department employees); Melton v. City of
Atlanta, 324 F. Supp. 315, 318-20, 76 L.R.R.M. 2511, 2514-15 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (police.
men); United Fed'n of Postal Clerks v. Blount, 325 F. Supp. 879, 883, 76 L.R.R.M.
2932, 2934-35 (D.D.C. 1969), q/J'd, 404 U.S. 802 (1971) (post office workers); Atkins v.
City of Charlotte, 296 F. Supp. 1068, 1075-78, 70 L.R.R.M. 2732, 2736-39 (W.D.N.C.
1969) (firefighters).
3 ' See, e.g., Police Officers' Guild v. Washington, 369 F. Supp. 543, 550-53, 85
L.R.R.M. 2203, 2208-10 (D.D.C. 1973) (three-judge court) (invalidating statute prohibit-
ing police officers from associating with, becoming members of, or affiliating with, any
organization which "holds, claims, or uses" the right to strike); Alabama Labor Council
v. Frazier, 81 L.R.R.M. 2155, 2156 (Madison County Cir. Ct., Ala. 1972) (invalidating
statute providing that any employee who joins or participates in a union loses all rights
under the state merit system).
3 " For discussions of the significance of exclusive recognition to effective union
representation, see Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Additon Community Organiza-
tion, 420 U.S. 50, 62-65 (1975); NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175,
180-82 (1967).
999
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
an employer to bargain solely with the union representing a majority
of its employees, to negotiate in good faith with the exclusive rep-
resentative, and to refuse to bargain with a rival union or with indi-
vidual employees. On the other hand, a union, having gained exclu-
sive recognition, is required to negotiate in good faith with the public
employer and to fairly represent all employees in the particular bar-
gaining unit whether they are members of that union, a rival labor
organization, or no organization.3" Thus, the doctrine encourages
good faith bargaining by both the union and the employer while pro-
tecting the rights of individual employees.
In the private sector, sections 2, Ninth of the Railway Labor
Act" and 9(a) of the Taft-Hartley Ace" mandate exclusive
recognition." The constitutionality of the principle of exclusive rec-
ognition of an employee organization was established long ago in the
private sector. In upholding the constitutionality of the Railway Labor
Act provision in Virginian Railway Co. v. System Federation No. 4043 the
Supreme Court stated: "ftJhe Fifth Amendment, like the Fourteenth,
... is not a guarantee of untrammeled freedom of action and of con-
tract. In the exercise of its power to regulate commerce, Congress can
subject both to restraints not shown to be unreasonable."44 The Court
found that the proyision requiring exclusive recognition was not un-
reasonable because it did not interfere with the employer's right to
select or discharge employees.'" The Court subsequently employed
the same reasoning in upholding the constitutionality of the Taft-
Hartley Act provision in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.46
"See notes and text at notes 67-74 infra.
4045  U.S.C. § 152, Ninth (1970) provides in pertinent part:
If any dispute shall arise among a carrier's employees as to who are
the representatives of such employees designated and authorized in accor-
dance with the requirements of this chapter, it shall be the duty of the
Mediation Board, upon request of either party to the dispute, to investi-
gate such dispute and to certify to both parties, in writing, within thirty
days after the receipt of the invocation of its services, the name or names
of the individuals or organizations that have been designated and au-
thorized to represent the employees involved in the dispute, and certify
the same to the carrier. Upon receipt of such certification the carrier shall
treat with the representative so certified as the representative of the craft
or class for the purposes of this chapter.
29 U.S.C. § I59(a) (1970) provides, in pertinent part, that:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such
purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in
such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of
pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment ....
42 Viriginian Ry. Co. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 548 (1937) (Railway
Labor Act); NLRB v. Jones 84 Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 44 (1937) (Taft-Hartley
Act).
43 300 U.S. 515 (1937).
"Id. at 558 (citations omitted).
45 Id. at 559.
" 301 U.S. I, 44-45 (1937), citing Virginian Ry.
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The courts have found the principles which support the con-
stitutionality of exclusive recognition in the private sector equally valid
in the public sector. For example, in Local 858, AFT v. School District
No. 1, 47 a federal district court considered whether the granting of ex-
clusive access and communication rights to a majority organization
was unconstitutional under the first and fourteenth amendments. The
members of the minority organization first argued that giving one
union exclusive privileges impaired their first amendment right to
freedom of association." The court stated that first amendment rights
"may be impaired by state Wien when the state can show a compel-
ling interest which, when balanced against the substantive right to be
protected, outweighs that right." 4 " The Local 858 court identified the
following state interests in permitting exclusive recognition in the pub-
lic sector: (I) allowing all employees to exercise the right to form and
join employee organizations; (2) providing the duly elected represen-
tative a ready means of communicating with all employees, not just its
membership, thus assuring a viable, effective employee organization;
(3) eliminating active interorganizational competition for membership
except during the brief periods of representation elections; and (4)
ensuring labor peace, enabling government bodies to effectively exe-
cute their assigned cluties. 5" On the other hand, the court found that
interference with the minority union members' freedom of association
was "limited.''' While they were not granted access to school com-
munication facilities nor were they provided with dues check-offs, the
minority union members were in no way prevented from communicat-
ing or associating with each other. The court held, therefore, that
there was no first amendment violation. 52
With respect to the fourteenth amendment challenge, the Local
858 plaintiffs alleged that exclusive recognition amounted to the giv-
ing of privileges to certain teachers while denying. them to others. 53
The court, while questioning whether a rational relationship or a
compelling slate interest test should be applied, found that the in-
terests enumerated above" established a compelling state interest. 55
Thus, the court concluded that': "We have been shown no authority,
nor has a convincing argument been advanced, to show a constitu-
tional infirmity in extending the ... [right to exclusive recognition]
from private employers to public employers." 5  The decisions of other
47 314 F. Supp. 1069, 74 L.R.R.M. 2385 (D. Colo. 1970).
"Id. at 1074, 74 L.R.R.M. at 2387.
45 /4. at 1076, 74 L.R.R.M. at 2389.
"M.
" Id.
52 M. at 1077, 74 L.R.R.M. at 2390.
53 Id.
5 ' See text at note 50 supra.
3° 314 F. Supp. at 1077-78, 74 L.R.R.M. at 2390-91.
53 Id. at 1075, 74 L.R.R.M. at 2388.
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federal" and state courts58 which have considered the constitutionality
of exclusive recognition in the public sector are in accord.
In addition to challenging the constitutionality of exclusive rec-
ognition, an employer or a minority union could attack the govern-
mental entity's authority to enter into agreements calling for exclusive
recognition. In the private sector, employers and unions are specifi-
cally authorized to enter such agreements by-the Railway Labor Act
and the Taft-Hartley Act.s" Similarly, over half the states have statutes,/
that explicitly provide for exclusive recognition in the public sector."
On the federal level, and in the remaining states, however, the au-
thority to enter such agreements must either be implied from other
statutory provisions or arrived at as a matter of common law. An ex-
ample of such implied authorization is the Presidential Executive
Order governing federal sector labor relations which provides for ex-
clusive recognition." The order is based on section 7301 of Title 5,
which provides that: "The President may prescribe regulations for the
conduct of employees in the executive branch."62 There appears to
have been no litigation on the issue of whether exclusive recognition
relates to the "conduct of employees." On the state level, however, a
few courts have determined that statutes, more tangentially related to
collective bargaining than section 7301, authorized state and local
governments to negotiate exclusive recognition clauses. For example,
in Fire Fighters Local 345 v. Burke63 a Kentucky court found that a city
could enter exclusive representation agreements even though the
legislature did "not specifically provide authority for such collective
bargaining agreements."'" The court reasoned that the legislature's es-
tablishment of medical and life insurance plans for public employees
revealed a public policy favoring such agreements." In addition, at
"Federation of Teachers v. Board of Educ., 335 F. Supp. 385, 389, 78 L.R.R.M.
2764, 2767 (D. Del. 1971). One federal court decision to the contrary was later vacated
by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Federation of Teachers v. Area Schools, 499
F.2d 115, 86 L.R.R.M. 2075 (7th Cir. 1974).
38 E.g., Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. School District, - Nev. -, -, 532 P.2d
1032, 1033, 88 L.R.R.M. 3391, 3391 (Nev. 1975); Turnpike Employee's Union v.
Turnpike Auth., 123 N.J. Super. 461, 466-67, 303 A.2d 599, 602-03, 83 L.R.R.M. 2250,
2252 (1973), ard, 64 N.J. 379, 319 A.2d 224 (1974); Bauch v. New York, 21 N.Y.2d
599, 606-08, 289 N.Y.S.2d 951, 955-56, 237 N.E.2d 211, 214-15, 67 L.R.R.M. 2994,
2996-97, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 834 (1968).
59 See notes and text at notes 40-46 supra.
"See Note, The Minnesota Public Employment Labor Relations Act of 1971,57 MINN.
L. REV. 134, 145-46 (1972); D. Wourrr & R. CHANIN, THE LAW AND PRAcricz OF
TEACHER NEGOTIATIONS 1001-1132 (1973) (containing the texts of twenty-two state stat-
utes requiring exclusive representation in teacher negotiations).
°' Exec. Order No. 11,491, 3 C.F.R. 861, 865-66 (Supp. 1966-70), as amended by
Exec. Order No. 11,838 3A C.F.R. 126, 127-78 (1975).
el 5 U.S.C. 7301 (1970).
83 75 L.R.R.M. 2001 (Ky. Cir. Ct. 1970).
"Id. at 2004.
"Id. Cf Civil Serv. Forum v. New York City Transit Authority, 4 App. Div. 2d
117, 125, 163 N.Y.S.2d 476, 484, 40 L.R.R.M. 2385, 2389 (2d Dept 1957), aff'd, 4
N.Y.2d 866, 174 N.Y.S.2d 234, 150 N.E.2d 705 (1958).
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least one state appears to have permitted public sector exclusive rec-
ognition as a matter of common law. 66 Thus, challenges to the princi-
ple of exclusive recognition in the public sector, whether based on al-
leged unconstitutionality or on an alleged lack of authority, have been
unsuccessful.
C. Right to Fair Representation
In endorsing the concept of majority rule embodied in the prin-
ciple of exclusive recognition, the courts and various legislatures have
not sacrificed minority employee rights. Minority employees both in
the private 67 and public sectors," have a right of fair representation
owed to them by the exclusively recognized union of the particular
bargaining unit. This right mandates that the exclusively recognized
union "make an honest effort to serve the interests of all [bargaining
unit] members, without hostility to any" and "subject always to com-
plete good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its
discretion."'"
The doctrine of fair representation in the private sector was ju-
dicially created. The United States Supreme Court has held that since
the interest•of the individual employee is subordinated to the collec-
tive interests of all employees in the bargaining unit both the National
Labor Relations Act,'" and the Railway Labor Act" impose upon the
union the duty to represent all bargaining unit employees fairly." In
the public sector the doctrine of fair representation has usually been
specifically mandated in legislation." The difference in approach be-
tween the private and public sector seems to be primarily a result of
the fact that most public sector bargaining laws have been enacted
after the National Labor Relations Act and the Railway Labor Act.
Most state legislatures, therefore, had the advantage of the Supreme
Court's determination that the right to exclusive recognition, to avoid
tyranny of the majority, must be tempered with the right to fair rep-
resentation.
" In Education Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 76 III. App. 2d 456, 472, 222 N.E.2d
243, 251 (1966), the court stated: "We conclude that the Board of Education of the City
of Chicago does not require legislative authority to enter into a collective bargaining
agreement with a sole collective bargaining agency selected by its teachers ...." Cf.
Local 858, AFT v. School District No. I, 314 F. Supp. 1069 (D. Colo. 1970) (court up-
holds exclusive recognition clause between school district and teacher's union without
discussing any statutory authorization for such clauses).
67 See text at notes 70-72 infra.
6$ See text at notes 73-74 infra.
°a Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337-38 (1953) (emphasis added).
Accord, Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 342 (1964).
7° Syres v. Local 23, Oil Workers, 350 U.S. 892 (1955).
" Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 198-99, 202-04 (1944).
" Accord, Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., — U.S. —, —, 96 S. Ct.
1048, 1056-57. (1976); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967).
"See, e.g., Kaufman v. Goldberg, 64 Misc. 2d 524, 531-33, 315 N.Y.S.2d 35,
43-44, 75 L.R.R.M. 2903, 2907.08 (1970).
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In contrast to the judicial articulation of the right to fair rep-
resentation, the legislative approach does not appear to have resulted
in any material differences in the substance of the right accorded in
the private and public sectors. The typical state labor relations provi-
sion requires both that the certified majority representative bargain
for all employees within the bargaining unit and that all employees
receive equally all the benefits of the collective bargaining agreement
negotiated by the union and the employer. Additionally, it is the ob-
ligation of the union to process grievances of employees expeditiously,
whether or not they are members of the union." Consequently, in the
public sector, just as in the private sector, the right to fair representa-
tion has accompanied the right to exclusive recognition.
D. Conclusion
As the rights of public employees have developed, the distinctions
between private and public sector unionism have become less pro-
nounced. Public employees, like their private counterparts, seem to
have firmly established (their right to join unions, to have the majority
unions recognized as exclusive representatives, and to have.such major-
ity unions provide fair representation. Again as in the private sector,
this increase in public employee rights has been attained through a
process which balances the need for such rights against the correspond-
ing decrease in management prerogative. In the public sector, however,
the weight of management prerogatives is increased by notions of
sovereignty, delegation, and the public interest." Consequently, in spite
of the recent development in public employee rights, the right to
negotiate union security provisions, a right firmly established in the
private sector, is still in a relative state of flux in the public sector.
II. UNION SECURITY PROVISIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
With the acceptance of unionization in the public sector, atten-
tion has focused on the validity of union security provisions—whether
all members of the bargaining unit for which the union is the exclu-
sive bargaining representative should be required as a condition of
continued employment either to join the union or pay a proportionate
share of the union's collective bargaining costs. Unionists often adopt
the strong view of Samuel Gompers that those who do not join the
union but receive benefits are despicable "parasites."" Others advo-
74 E.g., MoNT. REV. CODES ANN. § 59-1603(3), (4) (Su pp. 1975): VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, 172600 (Supp. 1975).
" Indeed, the public interest is the basis on which public employees are still de-
nied the right to strike. See Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269,
83 A.2d 482, 28 L.R.R.M. 2408 (1951). For a discussion of the problems created for
public employee unionism by sovereignty, delegation, and the public interest, see the
notes and text at notes 16-23 supra.
18 A much-quoted statement by former AFL President Samuel Gompers is:
"Nonunionists who reap the rewards of union efforts, without contributing a dollar or
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cate that nonmembers should be allowed to be free riders enjoying all
the benefits of the union and the collective bargaining agreement, but
forcing the union members to bear all the costs. 77 Between these two
extremes there has emerged a middle position—a union security pro-
vision requiring bargaining unit employees to pay a set amount of
money to the union, but not requiring employees to join the union.
While the validity of all forms of union security continues to be dis-
puted, a trend is seemingly developing towards legislative authoriza-
tion of such a public sector union security provision. This trend is
perhaps best understood by surveying the forms of, the need for, and
the challenges to union security provisions.
A. The Forms of Public Sector Security Agreements
Union security devices in both the private and public sectors
have taken many forms—primarily including closed shop, union shop,
agency shop, fair share clauses, and occasionally maintenance of
membership clauses." For several decades, union security in America
was embodied chiefly in the closed shop agreement, which required
all employees to be union members at the time of their initial em-
ployment and which "closed the shop" to all nonunion employees.'"
Although once authorized B 0 the closed shop was outlawed in the pri-
vate sector in 1947 by section 8(a)(3) of the Taft-Hartley Act," which,
risking the loss of a day, are parasites. They are reaping the benefit from the union
spirit, while they themselves are debasing genuine manhood." S. GOMPERS, 12 AMER.
FEDERATIONIST 221 (1905).
"See NATIONAL RIGHT to WORK LEGAL DEFENSE FOUNDATION. INC.. ANNUAL
REPORT 1.2 (1974).
" Maintenance of membership clauses require that all those who are members of
the union as of the effective date of the collective bargaining agreement, or who join
thereafter, must continue their membership for some period set forth in the agree-
ment, usually the life of the agreement. Although maintenance of membership has
sometimes been classified as a union security device, Hopi!, The Agency Shop Question, 49
CORNELL L. Rev. 418, 478 n.4 (1964) Iheitinalter -cited as HopM, it will not be so
categorized for the purposes of this article. Unlike union shop, agency shop, and fair
share clauses, maintenance of membership agreements do not require nonmembers to
bear their share of the costs of union representation and do not eliminate the problem
of the free rider.
Two other kinds of contractual arrangements—exclusive recognition and dues
checkoff—have been misnamed as union security devices. See Hopfl, supra, at 478 n.4.
Neither conditions continued employment on union membership or on payments to the
union of a set fee, and neither is a true union security clause.
"See Pollitt, Right to Work Low Issues, 37 N.C. L. REV. 233, 236 (1959)
[hereinafter cited as Pollitt].
" Wagner Act, 49 Stat. 449 * 8(3) (1935). This congressional authorization for
the closed shop was sustained by the United States Supreme Court in Colgate-
Palmolive-Peet Co. v. NLRB, 338 U.S. 355, 362-65 (1949). Besides the closed shop, the
Wagner Act authorized all other union security provisions. See NLRB v. General Motors
Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 739 (1963).
" 29 U.S.C. 9 158(a) (3) (1970). See NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S.
734, 740 (1963). The Act further limits union security agreements between unions and
employers by yielding in g 14(b) to state laws which restrict or prohibit such agree-
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as the Supreme Court has suggested, served to eliminate "... the.
most serious abuses of compulsory unionism......82 The closed shop
has never existed to any significant extent in the public sector.
Union shop clauses mandate that all employees who are within
a particular bargaining unit and covered by a collective bargaining
agreement must join the exclusively recognized employee organization
and must pay dues and initiation fees upon the completion of a
specified time period, usually thirty days." In the absence of state
right to work legislation," union shop provisions are permitted in the
private sector by section 8(a)(3) of the Taft-Hartley Act" and section
2 of the Railway Labor Act," and are also present in the public
sector.87 Such clauses have been upheld against claims that they force
employees into ideological and political associations in violation of The
first amendment and that they deprive employees of a liberty interest
without due process in violation of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments.88 The Supreme Court rejected the first amendment
claims on the ground that political and ideological coercion is not a
ments. Section 14(b), 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1970), states: "Nothing in this subchapter shall
be construed as authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring mem-
bership in a labor organization as a condition of employment in any State or Territory
in which such execution or application is prohibited by State or Territorial law." Na-
tional debate on the closed shop has continued and unsuccessful attempts have been
made to repeal § 14(6). For example, in 1965 a labor-supported bill was introduced to
repeal § 14(b). On July 28, 1965 the House of Representatives passed H.R. 77, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), but the bill died in the Senate.
n NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 740 (1963). See S. REP, NO. 105,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 411-13 (1947).
8' See Pollitt, supra note 79, at 235. Some collective bargaining agreements contain
a modified union shop clause which exempts present employees who are not members
of the union from the requirement of joining the union as a condition of continued
employment. Any newly hired employee, however, must join the union within the time
period specified in the clause.
84 See note 123 infra.
83 29 U.S.C. § I 58(a) (3) (1970).
86 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh (1970) (60 not 30 days).
8' See generally Con' EMIL REL. REP. (BNA), § 85 at 3511-3611 (Reference File),
For executive employees or the federal government, § 1(a) of Exec. Order No. 11,491
3, C.F.R. 861, 862 (Supp. 1966-70) prohibits all forms of union security arrangements
and states that all employees have the right to refrain from joining or assisting labor
organizations.
Some states have expressly authorized negotiation of union shop provisions in
the public sector. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.110(6) (I) (1972) (state and local gov-
ernment employees; local opt out); Ky. REV, STAT. Ar:m. § 345.050(1) (c) (Supp. 1974)
(Baldwin) (firefighters); ME. REV. sta. ANN. tit. 26, § 1027(3) (Supp. 1975-76) (Univer-
sity of Maine employees); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § I726(a) (8) (Supp. 1975) (municipal
employees); and WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 41.56.122 (Supp. 1975) (local employees; re-
ligious exemption available), id. 41.06.150 (Supp. 1975) (state civil service; majority of
bargaining unit employees must approve the provision; religious exemption available),
and id. 28B.16.100(1) (Supp. 1975) (state higher education personnel; majority of
bargaining unit employees must approve the provision; religious exemption available).
For a discussion of two Washington cases construing the Washington law for state civil
service employees, see notes and text at notes 175-80 infra.
"Railway Employees Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 234-37 (1956).
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necessary result of union membership." In rejecting the due process
claim, the Court upheld the reasonableness of Congress's determina-
tion that union shop clauses enhance employees' right to work."
Union shop clauses have also been upheld against claims that they vio-
late Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 91
Agency shop clauses do not require bargaining unit employees
to join or remain members of the union as a condition of continued
employment. However, if an employee chooses not to join the union,
the employee must pay a fee to the exclusively recognized employee
organization. 92 The fee is usually, but not necessarily, equal to the
amount of union dues, and typically excludes union fines or assess-
ments. The major advantage to the agency shop clause is that while
requiring all employees to share the cost of union representation, it al-
lows nonmembers to refrain from all union activity. Thus, the agency
shop clause does not require an employee to associate with an organi-
zation to which he or she may be opposed. The major disadvantage in
the agency shop approach is that the agency fee payor has no voice or
vote in union affairs. 93 In the public sector, as in private industry,
"Id. at 236-38.
"Id. at 234-35. The Court in Hanson concluded: "We ... hold that the require-
ment for financial support of the collective-bargaining agency by all who receive the
benefits of its work is within the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause and
does not violate either the First or Fifth Amendments." /d. at 238. Accord, Brotherhood
of Ry. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 117-18 (1963); 1AM v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 746
(1961).
The recent decision in Marden v. IAM, 91 L.R.R.M. 2841 (S.D. Fla. 1976) does
not contradict these decisions of the Supreme Court. In Marden, employees were re-
quired to join the union (formal union membership), even though the union had a plan
allowing employees to pay an agency fee instead of becoming union members. The
"arden court held that the union membership requirements, as implemented, "artifi-
cially incluceld] uninformed emplOyees to become formal union members." Id. at 2843.
Thus, the court required that adequate notice be given to new employees of the availa-
bility of the agency fee payor alternative.
"See Burns v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co., 11 FEP Cas. 1441 (D. Ariz. 1976)
(union shop clause negotiated pursuant to Section 2, Eleventh of the Railway Labor
Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh (1970), does not violate Title VII since offer of union
and employer that employee pay an amount equal to dues and assessments, instead of
requiting union membership, is a "reasonable accomodation"). Cf. Yotts v. North Am.
Rockwell Corp., 501 F.2d 398, 8 FEP Cas. 546 ,(9th Cir. 1974) (union shop clause
negotiated pursuant to Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act does not vio-
late Title VII since the requirement of "reasonable accommodation" regarding em-
ployees who refuse for religious reasons to pay union dues does not require such an
accommodation where "undue hardship" on the union or the employer will result).
" 2 See Turnpike Employee's Union v. Turnpike Audi., 123 N.J. Super. 461, 464,
303 A.2d 599, 601, 83 L.R.R.M. 2250, 2251 (1973), affd, 64 N.J. 579, 319 A.2d 224, 86
L.R.R.M. 2842 (1974); Hopfl, supra note 78, at 478-83. An agency shop arrangement is
not an unfair labor praciice Under § 8(a)(3) of the Taff-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. §
158(a)(3) (1970), and is not prohibited by that Act. See NLRB v. General Motors Corp.,
373 U.S. 734, 735 (1963).
"Since the early 1960's, agency shop clauses have been gaining in popularity. See
Hopfl, supra note 78, at 480-82.
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agency shop provisions have been negotiated."
Some collective bargaining agreements contain modified agency
shop clauses called fair share clauses. A fair share clause defines the
amount of the fee as the actual (pro rata) costs of the union's services
rather than union dues." This actual cost fee can be more or less
than dues. Both the agency shop and the fair share arrangement
compensate the union for providing, as required under its duty of
fair representation, full and equal protection to all employees in the
bargaining unit, regardless of union membership status."
In this article, the term union security provision is confined to
service fee arrangements"—that is, arrangements which encompass
both agency shop and fair share provisions." Under such provisions
all employees in the bargaining unit are required as a condition of
continued employment to pay a service fee, but are not required to be
members of the union or to pay union fines or assessments. The
service fee is equal to either (1) the amount of union dues, or (2) the
actual (pro rata) costs of the union's services." As the Supreme Court
°' Several states permit the parties to negotiate agency shop arrangements. See,
e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.110(6)(2) (1972) (state and local government employees; local
opt out); CAL. GOVT CODE §§ 3540.1(i)(2), 3546 (Supp. 1976) (West) (public school em•
ployees; employer may request separate vote on provision); ME. REV. STAT. 1027(3)
(Supp. 1975-76) (University of Maine employees); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. flli
423.210(1)(c), (2) (Supp. 1975-76) (all state and local government employees except
state civil service); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § .59-1605(1)(c) (Supp. 1975) (state and local
government employees; religious exemption available); ORE. REV. STAT. § 243.666(1)
(1970) (state and local government employees; religious exemption available); VT. STAr.
ANN. tit. 21, § I726(a)(8) (Supp. 1975) (municipal employees); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
41.56.122 (Supp. 1975) (local employees; religious exemption available), id. § 41.06.150
(Supp. 1975) (state civil service; majority of bargaining unit employees must approve
the provision; religious exemption available), id. 41.59.100 (Supp. 1975) (public school
employees; religious opt out), id. § 288.16.100W (Supp. 1975) (state higher education
personnel; majority of bargaining unit employees must approve the provision; religious
exemption available); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.81(6), 111.85 (1974) (West) (state em-
ployees; referendum required), id. §.§. I I 1.70(1)(h), 111.70(2) (1974) (municipal em-
ployees; referendum can be requested).
" See MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch . 105E, § 12 (1974) (West) (fee "shall be propor-
tionately commensurate with the cost of collective bargaining and contract administra-
tion."). In Wisconsin, the statute authorizes the negotiation of "fair-share agreements"
but defines the proportionate share of contract administration and collective bargaining
as "dues uniformly required of all [union) members." Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.70(I)(h),
111.85(6) (1974) (West).
" See notes 67-74 supra.
9 ' A model service fee clause is as follows: "All employees in the collective bar-
gaining unit who are not and who do not become and remain union members shall, as
a condition of employment, pay to the union a service fee equivalent to the amount
uniformly required of its members."
°' Some state statutes use the term "service fee" when defining permissible union
security devices. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. 23.40.110(6)(2) (1972); CAL Gov-r. CODE §
3540.1(i)(2) (Supp. 1976)(West); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch . 105E, § 12 (1974) (West).
°° Rather than permitting the parties to negotiate, or requiring the employees to
approve, a union security provision, some states provide that once a labor union is cer-
tified as the exclusive representative an automatic service fee can be exacted from
nonmembers. See, e.g., Conn. Pub. Acts No. 75-566, § 11(a) (July 7, 1975) (state em-
ployees); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 89-4 (Supp. 1974) (state and local employees); MINN.
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stated in determining whether section 8(a)(3) of the Taft-Hartley
Act'°° prohibited such a service fee arrangement in the private sector:
"[T]he burdens of membership upon which employment may be con-
ditioned are expressly limited to the payment of initiation fees and
monthly dues. It is permissible to condition employment upon mem-
bership, but membership ... may in turn be conditioned only upon
payment of fees and dues."'°'' The same interpretation of "mem-
bership"—membership "whittled down to its financial core"" 2—applies
in the public sector.'° 3
B. The Need for Public Sector Security Agreements
The purposes of the union security provisions, as ex-
pressed in the legislative purpose clauses 114 and in the court
STAT. ANN. § 179.65(2) (Supp. 1975) (West) (state and local employees); R.I. GEN LAWS §
36-11-2 (Supp. 1975) (state employees). The Hawaii Public Employee Bargaining Law
requires that employers:
upon receiving from an exclusive representative a written statement which
specifies an amount of reasonable service fees necessary to defray the costs
for its services rendered in negotiating and administering an agreement
and computed on a pro rata basis among all employees within its approp-
riate bargaining unit, deduct ... the amount of service fees and remit the
amount to the exclusive representative.
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 89-4 (Supp. 1974).
'"" 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(3) (1970).
'°' NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963). Accord, NLRB v.
Hershey Foods Corp., 513 F.2d 1083, 89 L.R.R.M. 2126 (9th Cir. 1975) (in context of
union shop agreement, employee can only he required to tender to the union its lawful
dues and cannot be required to participate in any union activities, nor be subject to
union discipline or in any manner be considered a "member" of the union). CI Radio
Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 41-42 (1954); Union Starch & Refining Co. v.
NLRB, 186 F.2d 1008, 1012-13, 27 L.R.R.M. 2342, 2345.46 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 815 (1951).
10 ' NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963). See also AFTRA
and Buckley & Evans, 222 N.L.R.B. No. 34, 91 L.R.R.M. 1094, 1096 (1976) (union,
pursuant to union shop provision authorized under .§ 80)(3) of the Taft-Hartley Act,
cannot require performers be "full fledged members," but can only require "financial
core" membership).
. 1 ° 3 See, e.g., Tremblay v. Berlin Police Union, 108 N.H. 416, 422, 237 A.2d 668,
672, 68 L.R.R.M. 2070, 2073 (1968) (construing union shop agreement as an agency
shop); Association of Capitol Powerhouse Eng'rs v. Division of Bldgs. & Grounds, 92
L.R.R.M. 2748, 2751 (Thurston County Super. Ct., Wash., 1976) (statute requiring
membership means only, financial obligation).
'"E.g., MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 59-1601 (Supp. 1975); ORE. REV. STAT.
243.656 (1973). The First Biennial Report to the 42nd Session of the Washington State
Legislature of the Public Employees Bargaining Committee recommended authorizing
public sector union security provisions. This recommendation was later enacted as
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 41.06.150 (Supp. 1975). In that report, the committee stated:
These devices enable the employee organization to play a more responsible
role by obviating the temptation to pressure non-members, and giving the
organization some direction in the discipline of members who violate the
agreements and rules. It makes less urgent the incentive to pursue an ag-
gressive policy in order to maintain membership by assuring a stable in-
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decisions,106 are to avoid labor strife, to secure economic stability, to in-
sure the efficiency and continuity of state and local governments, and
to develop harmonious relationships between the public employer and
its employees. Union security provisions are thought to achieve these
goals by reducing the potential for conflict both among public em-
ployees and between public employees and their employers, which may
arise where some employees obtain the benefits of unionization without
contributing to its costs. The union member who supports the union
with dues resents those who "ride the union train" without cost. The
union viewpoint, supported by commentators1°6 as well as by courts,'"
is that union security provisions prevent nonunion employees of the
bargaining unit from enjoying a free ride.'08 The pressure for service
fee arrangements and against the free rider comes not just from the
leadership of the unions, but from rank-and-file union members.'"
come.... It further removes the inequity of permitting the non-member
of the opportunity to refuse to pay for the benefits he enjoys as a result of
the organization's bargaining efforts.
In 1973, the Michigan legislature specifically authorized union security in public
employment. MICH. COMP, LAWS ANN. § 423.210 (Supp. 1975-76). The legislative intent
was stated by the Chairman of the Labor Committee.
This bill is intended ... to reaffirm the original legislative in-
tent that if a public employer and a union representing its employees so
negotiate, they can require an agency shop or service fee exactly the same
in amount as the dues which [the] union requires of its members.... This
bill will contribute to fairness and stability of labor relations in the public sec-
tor.
28 Mich. H.R. Journal 598, cited in Sachs, Labor Law, 20 WAYNE L. Rev. 515, 543-44
n.158 (1979) (emphasis added).
1" See, e.g., Robbinsdale Educ. Ass'n v. Robbinsdale Fed'n of Teachers Local 872,
— Minn. — , — , 239 N.W.2d 437, 443, 92 L.R.R.M. 2417,-2421-22 (1976), U.S.
App, pending sub. nom., Threlkeld v. Robbinsdale Fed'n of Teachers Local 872, 44
U.S.L.W. 3677 (1976); Nagy v. Detroit, 71 L.R.R.M. 2362, 2364 (Wayne County Cir.
Ct., Mich. 1969).
l°6 See, e.g., D. SULLIVAN. PUBI.IC EMPLOYEE LABOR LAW 137-38 (1969); Blainsupra
note 11, at 189-90.
'°' See, e.g., Ball v. Detroit, Civil No. 159-940 at 42 (Wayne County Cir. Ct., Mich.
1975), appeal docketed, No. 25586 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975); Nagy v. Detroit, 71 L.R.R.M.
2362, 2364 (Wayne County Cir. Ct., Mich. 1969)..Cf. North Kingstown v. North Kings-
town Teachers Ass'n, 110 R.I. 698, 706-07, 297 A.2d 342,346, 82 L.R.R.M. 2010, 2013
(1972).
I°8 A free rider is an individual who enjoys all the benefits of the collective bar-
gaining agreement, yet does not pay the union for any of the costs of negotiating and
administering the agreement. See cases cited in note 10.7 supra.
'°° Richardson v. Communications Workers, 530 F.2d 126, 91 L.R.R.M. 2506
(8th Cir. 1976), is an extreme illustration of this principle in the private sector. Richard-
son, a former employee of the Western Electric Company of Omaha, Nebraska, was for
many years a member of Local 7495, Communications Workers of America. 443 F.2d
974, 977, 77 L.R.R.M. 2566, 2567 (8th Cir. 1971). In January, 1966, he resigned from
the union but remained employed at Western Electric. Id. His fellow employees, how-
ever, did not take this action kindly. According to the allegations filed by Richardson,
his co-workers engaged in such acts as refusing to work overtime with him, tripping,
shoving, striking with fists, striking with footballs, cursing, and using epithets and ob-
scenities. In September of that year, he became involved in an altercation with another
employee and was discharged. Id. In December, he sued the company and the union
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Union organization and recognition often come hard, and once
achieved are costly to maintain. Indeed, unions expend a large
amount of financial and other resources in negotiating and adminis-
tering collective bargaining agreements."° Under the predominant
type of state public employment collective bargaining legislation, the
union that is the exclusive representative has a duty of fair represen-
tation with reference to all bargaining unit employees—union mem-
bers and nonmembers alike."' Proponents of service fee arrange-
ments argue that if employees cannot be forced to join the union as a
condition of continued employment,'" they should at least be re-
quired to share the costs of union representation—the costs of
negotiating and administering the collective bargaining agreement
which applies equally to them and from which they derive equal
benefits.'" The requirement that all individuals who benefit from
union activities contribute their fair share of the costs is but an appli-
cation of the democratic concept in that the service fee arrangement
"is analogous to all Americans being taxed for the costs of govern-
for failing to take steps to prevent harassment by his co-workers. Ten years later, the
suit is still pending in the federal courts. There have been three jury trials and three
appeals to the court of appeals. 530 F.2d at 128-29, 91 L.R.R.M. at 2507. See also 486
F.2d 801, 84 L.R.R.M. 2617 (8th Cir. 1973); 469 F.2d 333, 81 L.R.R.M. 2801 (8th Cir.
1971).
"° Examples of some of the more costly union functions include:
I) Payment of salaries and expenses for staff engaged in negotiation and ad-
ministration of the contract;
2) Payment of general office and overhead expenses;
3) Maintenance of a research department which prepares local representatives
for contract negotiations, prepares economic data, drafts contract language, and
evaluates contract proposals;
4) Maintenance of a legal department or retained counsel which represents em-
ployees in arbitration, disciplinary proceedings, and negotiations; communicates sig-
nificant legal developments in other parts of the country; and assists in significant legal
cases;
5) Provision of training in grievance handling—including arbitration and com-
munication of local employee needs to their immediate employer or relevant govern-
ment bodies and to their community;
6) Provision of information on activities of affiliates around the country, and
their varying solutions to common problems;
7) Provision of assistance in federal and state legislative efforts with respect to
public employees—including revenue sharing, civil rights, minimum wage laws, unem-
ployment compensation, pension legislation, health insurance, public jobs programs,
and occupational health and safety.
'" See notes and text at notes 67-74 supra.
"'See notes and text at notes 97-103 supra.
'" See Palombo, The Agency Shop in a Public Service Merit System, 26 LAB. L. J. 409,
411-12 (1975). The free rider concept was discussed by the Minnesota Supreme Court
in Robbinsdale Educ. Ass'n v. Robbinsdale Fed'n of Teachers Local 872, — Minn.
— , — , 239 N.W.2d 437,443, 92 L.R.R.M. 2417, 2421, U.S. App. Pending sub. nom.
Threlkeld v. Robbinsdale Fed'n of Teachers Local 872, 44 U.S.L.W. 3677 (1976). The
Robbinsdale court accepted the state's reasoning as to the interplay of the free rider con-
cept and the duty of fair representation as a legitimate government interest sufficient to
withstand an attack on the constitutionality of the Minnesota service fee statute. Id. Rob-
binsdale is discussed in the text at notes 189-93 infra.
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ment expenditures and the benefits received therefrom. ”114
Union security arrangements also tend to stabilize labor relations
between public sector employees and their employers." 5 Absent union
security, unions are faced with the necessity of constant persuasion to
hold on to their present membership. The unions then
must demonstrate that they can "get something" for their
members. They are driven to making excessive demands on
the [employer] in negotiations and in processing unwar-
ranted grievances as a tactical means of holding their con-
stituency. Similarly, they find it advantageous to disparage
management and to portray it as unmindful of employees'
interests as a means of convincing workers of their need for
a union. If union membership were made a simple condi-
tion of employment, the unions argue, it would be less
necessary to engage in such propaganda, which admittedly
has a harmful effect on the bargaining relationship. 116
Furthermore, when unions do not have to use their resources to ob-
tain and retain members, they can devote more time to bargaining
and administration of the collective bargaining agreement." 7 With
service fee arrangements, unions can make concessions helpful to
management and the public interest, even though some of the conces-
sions may not be beneficial to the short-run.
union
 of some bargain-
ing unit employees. Thus, for example, a nion could withstand em-
ployee demands for an immediate wage increase in a situation where
a financially troubled employer could be driven out of business. With-
out the financial 'security of a service fee arrangement, the union
would have to press for the wage increase demanded by the union
members even though the result, the potential bankruptcy of the em-
ployer, would be to the over-all detriment of the union, the employer,
and the public. As Professor Summer Slichter observed with respect
to private sector labor relations: "[a]n assured status for the union is
not a guarantee of successful union-employer relations but it is a
prerequisite ...." 1 " Thirty years later, similar sentiments were ex-
"'District Council 37, AFSCME, An Agency Shop for Public Employees in New
York City, at 4 (unpublished research memorandum) quoted in Palomob, supra note 113,
at 412. See also 3 New York State Commission on the Quality and Financing of Elemen-
tary Education 10-16 (Appendix I3C) (1972).
" 5 See Blair, supra note I I, at 189.
116 N. CHAMBERLAIN & D. CULLEN. THE LABOR SECTOR 173-74 (1971). See also
Blair, supra note II, at 189; Hopfl, supra•note 78, at 501.
"' See generally DOL. supra note 8, at 97; Gotbaum, Collective Bargaining and the
Union Leader, in PUBLIC WORKERS AND PUBLIC UNIONS 84-85 (S. Zagoria ed. 1972).
118 5. SLIGHTER. UNION POLICIES AND INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT 95 (1941). Private
sector employers tend to favor union security agreements. The reasons for this prefer-
ence, summarized in a National Industrial Conference Board study are as follows:
I. "elimination of friction and strife within the working force";
2. "Gives employees greater feelings of responsibility and interest in their
jobs because they feel they have something to say about their conditions of
work"; and
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pressed with respect to public sector labor relations:
an indispensible [sic) element in making collective bargain-
ing produce peaceful settlements that both sides can live
with is the capacity of the union to exercise its respon-
sibilities with a meaningful sense of security.... It must ...
have the financial stability that flows from the fact that the
costs entailed in exercising its responsibilities, as the bar-
gaining, representative for all employees in the bargaining
unit, are being shared by all employees in that unit."
Thus, the need for union security is as great in the public sector
as it is in the private sector. In both areas, labor peace is furthered by
reducing tensions among employees and between unions and man-
agement. Indeed, the need for union security may be even greater in
the public sector where any breach of the labor peace has the poten-
tial of disrupting essential government services. Therefore, it is some-
what surprising that the validity of union security provisions, having
been established in the private sector, should be challenged again in
the public sector.12°
C. The Validity of Public Sector Union Security Agreements
Litigation challenging public sector union security provisions has
increased in recent years.'" The attacks have focused primarily upon
the constitutionality of both the collection and use of service fees.
Many of the cases have not yet reached a final determination on the
merits. Where they have, most of these attacks have failed. Still, chal-
lenges to the use of service fees have led public sector unions to de-
velop rebate procedures in order to protect the constitutional rights of
service fee payors.
1. Judicial Challenges to the Collection of Service Fees
Since there is no federal collective bargaining law for employees
of states and their political subdivisions, the authority to negotiate ser-
vice fee provisions in the public sector varies from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction.'" Some jurisdictions have prohibited union security pro-
3. "[creates) more responsible unions. It does not have to struggle to hold
its membership by repeatedly demonstrating its ability to obtain new ad-
vantages."
National Industrial Conference Board, The Closed Shop, 12 STUDIES IN PERSONNEL POLICY
7(1939).
"9 Gromfine, Union Security Clauses in Public Employment, N.Y.U. CONK ON LAB.
285, 287-88 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Cromfine].
For a discussion of two reasons for the large number of challenges to public
sector onion security agreements, see text at notes,I2-15 supra.
In These challenges have been frequently initiated and supported by the Na-
tional Right to Work Foundation. See note 9 supra.
22' Because of the breadth of the topic—judicial challenges to union security
provisions—this article will analyze only the validity of union security devices au-
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visions by enacting broad right to work guarantees, either through
legislative or constitutional mandate.' 23 A typical right to work law can
be found in Alabama. After declaring the policy of the state to be that
"the right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on ac-
count of membership or nonmembership in any labor union or
organization :1124 the statute states that "kilo employer shall require
any person, as a condition of employment or continuation of em-
ployment, to pay any dues, fees or other charges of any kind to any
labor union or labor organization." 23 When such prohibitions apply
to public employees, public sector service fee arrangements cannot be
negotiated. Absent such prohibitions, there are two methods by which
to authorize union security arrangements: (1) state law may be silent
on the issue of public sector union security—this may permit, but not
require, negotiation of service fee provisions; or (2) state law may ex-
pressly authorize public sector union security—this may mean either
that service fee provisions can be negotiated or that such provisions
are automatic upon the request of the exclusively recognized union or
upon a vote of the bargaining unit employees. Under both methods
of authorization, the collection of service fees has been held to be con-
stitutional.
a. When State Law is Silent
State law could be site& on the issue of public sector union se-
curity either because the state has no public sector collective bargain-
ing statute at all, or because the state has a public sector collective
'bargaining statute that makes no mention of union security. If there is
no public sector collective bargaining law in a state, the courts must
determihe if bargaining itself is permitted before determining wheth-
er a union security provision may be negotiated. The prevailing opin-
ion appears to be that such bargaining is not permitted absent statu-
thorized by state statutes and will not discuss ordinances, board resolutions, and other
sources of authority.
"'E.g., AIA. CODE tit. 26, 	 375 (1958); ARIZ. CONST. art. XXV, ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN.§ 23-1302(1971); ARK. CONST. amend. No.34, 1; FLA. CoNsT. art.14 ,6;CA.CODF.ANN
54-903 (1974); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 736A.1 & .4 - (1950); KAN. CONST. art. 15, 12,
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-831 (Supp. 1975); LA. Rev. STAT. §§ 23:881-89 (1964) (West) (ag-
ricultural workers only); Miss. CONST. art. 7, 198-A, Miss. CODE ANN. § 71-1.47 (1972);
NEB. CONST. art. XV, 44 13-15; NEV. REV. STAT. §4 613.250 & .270 (1973); N.C. GEN.
STAT. 44 95-78 to -84 (1975) (not applicable to public employees, 95-100 (1975));.N.D.
CENT. CODE § 34-01-14 (1960); S.C. CODE ANN §§ 40-46 to -46.8 (1962); S.D. CONST.
amend. art. VI, 2, S.D. Compiled Laws Ann. §4 60-8-3 to -8-8 (1967); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 50-208 to -213 (1966); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. § 5207(a) (1970) (Vernon)
UTAH CODE ANN. 34-34-2 (1974); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 40.1-58 to -69 (1970); as amended
by § 40.1-58.1 (Supp. 1975); and Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-245.1 to -245.8 (1967). New
Mexico prohibits union and agency shop provisions for state civil service employees.
Section VIII G., Regulations of New.Mexico State Personnel Board.
" 4 ALA. CODE tit. 26, 375(I) (1958).
182 1d. at 375(5).
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tory authorization.'" One of the earliest and fullest developments of
this opinion is contained in the Missouri case of Springfield v. Clouse. 127
After recognizing that "there is nothing improper in the organization
of municipal employees into labor unions,"'" the court held that col-
lective bargaining was not permissible in the public sector because, in
the absence of legislative authorization, such bargaining would "mean
government by private agreement and not by laws made by the rep-
resentatives of the people."'" While this rule against common law col-
lective bargaining is still mentioned frequently in dicta,'"" its practical
significance has been eroded by two factors. First, over half of the
state legislatures have now adopted statutes authorizing public sector
collective bargaining.' 3 ' Second, a number of state courts have been
willing to imply such legislative authorization in statutes dealing with
the authority of local governmental bodies.'"
When a jurisdiction has enacted a public sector bargaining stat-
ute which is silent with respect to union security or when a jurisdic-
tion has established public sector collective bargaining by judicial im-
plication, the courts must first determine whether any form of union
security provision can be negotiated. Most states which permit public
sector collective bargaining mandate bargaining on "wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment." 33 A few courts have
held that such language, absent other statutory prohibition, permits
the negotiation of union security arrangements. For example, in the
landmark case of Tremblay v. Berlin Police Union, 134 a municipal police
department entered into a union shop agreement. Construing the
agreement as an agency shop, the New Hampshire Supreme Court
126 In International Broth'd of Elec. Workers, Local 611 v. Town of Farmington,
75 N.M. 393, 394, 405 P.2d 233, 235, 60 L.R.R.M. 2001, 2001-02 (1965), the court, •
while holding such an agreement valid, stated: "We recognize that, absent legislative au-
thorization, the courts of other jurisdictions have generally viewed as invalid any
agreement between government management and public employees consummated
through a process of collective bargaining." See cases cited id. at 394.96, 405 P.2d at
234-35, 60 L.R.R.M. at 2002-03.
'" 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539 (1947).
'"ht. at 1247, 206 S.W.2d at 542.
190 Id. at 1249, 206 S.W.2d at 544.
13 ° E.g., State v. Educational Ass'n, 326 A.2d 868,874 (Del. Ch. 1974); City of
Haywood v. United Public Employees Local 390, 54 Cal. App. 3d 761, 763, 126 Cal.
Rptr. 710, 711, 91 L.R.R.M. 2898, 2899 (1st Dist. 1976).
13 ' See note 5 supra. In fact, the express holding of Clouse was changed by statute
in Missouri. See State v. Julian, 359 Mo. 539, 222 S.W.2d 720,24 L.R.R.M. 2341 (1949).
"IE.g., Teachers' Ass'n v. Parish Sch. B'd, — La. — , 303 S.2d 564, (1974);
Fire Fighters Local 345 v. Burke, 75 L.R.R.M. 2001 (Ky. Cir. Ct. 1970); International
Broth'd of Elec. Workers, Local 611 v. Town of Farmington, 75 N.M. 393, 405 P.2d 233,
60 L.R.R.M. 2001 (1965). But see Confederation of Police v. City of Chicago, 382 F.
Supp. 624 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
' 33 This phrase, used in the private sector in the Taft-Hartley Act, § 8(d), 29
U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970), describes the general scope of negotiable subjects. Similar
phrases have frequently been adopted in the public sector. E.g., ALASKA STAT.
23.40.250(1) (1972); Mnss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 150E, § 6 (1974).
194 108 N.H. 416, 237 A.2d 668, 68 L.R.R.M. 2070 (1968).
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held that the police department could enter into a union security
agreement with the union in the absence of state statutory approval.
Although a municipal ordinance authorized recognition of unions for
purposes of collective bargaining, the New Hampshire public em-
ployee statute was silent with respect to union security. The absence
of conflicting state law or policy was an important factor in upholding
the union security provision. 135 Similarly, in an early Michigan case,
Nagy v. City of Detroit, 138  a lower court held that an agency shop provi-
sion was a valid subject for collective bargaining.' 37 As in Tremblay, the
absence of a prohibiting state statute' 38 was a determinative factor.
However, since the Civil Service Commission of Detroit was not a
party to the negotiations the agreement reached was void.'"
Some courts have, however, concluded that a law authorizing
collective bargaining alone will not support union security agreements.
In Foltz v. City of Dayton,"° the court, after stating that "employees of
a city have a right to bargain collectively with the city,"'" invalidated
an agency shop clause between the city and a public service union.'"
The court reasoned that an agency shop clause, while it did aid the
union, served no governmental purpose.'" Further, by conditioning
government employment on the payment of a fee, the agency shop
clause violated the state civil service law which strictly governed the
appointment, tenure, promotion, removal, transfer, and suspension of
civil service employees.'"
As Tremblay, Nagy, and Foltz demonstrate, the crucial issue when
a public sector collective bargaining law is silent as to union security is
133 /d. at 422-23, 237 A.2d at 672-73, 68 L.R.R.M. at 2073-74.
133 71 L.R.R.M. 2362 (Wayne County Cir. Ct., Mich. 1969).
137 71 L.R.R.M. at 2369. Cf. Opinion Atty. Gen. 6449 (Ore. 1968) (union shop
agreement within plain meaning of "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment").
13° Present Michigan law authorizes the negotiation of agency shop provisions.
MICH.Come. LAWS ANN. 423.210(I)(c) Be (2) (1975). At the time of the Nagy suit this
statutory provision had not been enacted.
' 3° 71 L.R.R.M. at 2369-70. On April 15, 1970 defendants City of Detroit and
Council 77, AFSCME entered in a Memorandum of Understanding altering the exist-
ing collective bargaining agreement by inserting agency shop provisions, subject to the
conditions that Council 77 withdraw its appeal in Nagy and that the Civil Service Com-
mission approve the agency shop provision. Both conditions were met.
10 27 Ohio App. 2d 35, 272 N.E.2d 169, 75 L.R.R.M. 2321 (1970).
Id. at 42, 272 N.E.2d at 173, 75 L.R.R.M. at 2324.
" 3 /d. at 42-43, 272 N.E.2d at 173, 75 L.R.R.M. at 2324.
143 Id. at 38-39, 272 N.E.2d at 171, 75 L.R.R.M. at 2323.
'" Id. at 41-42, 272 N.E.2d at 171, 75 L.R.R.M. at 2322-23. Cf. Op. of Att'y Gen.
743 (Mo. 1970), reported at 1970 Gorr Emit. REL. Rep. (BNA), No. 370, B-8 (in absence
of authorizing legislation, no authority exists to agree to a dues check-off provision or
to grant an agency shop).
The Foltz court based its holding that union security provisions could not be
negotiated under Ohio public sector collective bargaining law on Hagerman v. City of
Dayton, 147 Ohio 313, 71 N.E.2d 246 (1947). Two concurring opinions in Foltz stated
that conditions had changed since Hagerman was decided and that the Ohio Supreme
Court should overrule it. 27 Ohio App. 2d at 43-44, 272 N.E.2d at 174-75, 75 L.R.R.M.
at 2325.
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the effect of other statutory provisions. These provisions may guaran-
tee public employees the right to join or not join a labor organization
(right to refrain),'45 may prohibit discrimination in a manner which
encourages or discourages union membership,"° or may, as in Foltz,
establish certain restrictions on the relations between government em-
ployers and employees. Thus, most successful challengers to the col-
lection of service fees have seized upon such provisions and argued
that they are inconsistent with union security in the public sector. An
example of such a challenge based on the statutory Tight to refrain is
North Kingston v. North Kingston Teachers Association.'47 In that case, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court construed the statutory right to
refrain'48 as prohibiting a union shop, yet it did not go so far as to
find that that right required the invalidation of all public sector union
security agreements. Indeed, the court stated that arrangements
which required nonmembers to pay only for the actual costs of ben-
efits received would not violate the employee's right to refrain."9 The
court further found that "it would be manifestly inequitable to permit
those who see fit not to join the union to benefit from its services
without at the same time requiring them to bear a fair and just share
of the financial burdens ... ."15° The court thus expressly limited its
approval of union security provisions to those which exact from the
non-union member no more than a proportionate share of the costs
of securing the benefits conferred upon all members of the bargain-
ing unit.'' One year later, in Local 194, New Jersey Turnpike Employees
Union v. New Jersey Turnpike Authority,'" the New Jersey Supreme
Court affirmed a lower appellate court which had held that an agency
shop agreement mandating employees to pay a fee equivalent to dues
violated the state statute' 53 protecting an employee's right to refrain
from joining or assisting a union.'" In so holding, the Supreme
E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.3 (Supp. 1976-77) (West); N.Y. CIV. SERV.
LAW § 202 (1973) (McKinney); N.D. CENT. CODE* 34-12-02 (1972); and S.D. COMPILED
LAWS ANN. § 3-18-2 (1974).
'" See, e.g., FIA. STAT. § § 447.501( I)(b) ac (2)(b) (Supp. 1975-76) and N.Y. CIV.
SERV. LAW* 209-a(1)(c) (1973) (McKinney).
'° 110 R.I. 698, 297 A.2d 342, 82 L.R.R.M. 2010 (1972).
'45 School Teachers' Arbitration Act, R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. 28-9.3-7, as enacted by
Pub. L. 1966, ch. 146 I. This provision was amended in 1975 to mandate service fee
arrangements upon certification of an exclusive bargaining representative. R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 28-9.3-7 (Supp. 1975).
45 110 R.I. at 701-07, 297 A.2d at 343-46, 82 L.R.R.M. at 2011-13.
th° Id. at 706, 297 A.2d at 346, 82 L.R.R.M. at 2013.
'5' Id. at 707, 297 A.2d at 346, 82 L.R.R.M. at 2013.
152 64 N.J. 579, 319 A.2d 224, 86 L.R.R.M. 2842 (1974), gig 123 N.J. Super.
461, 303 A.2d 599,83 L.R.R.M. 2250 (1973).
153 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.3 (Stipp. 1976-77) (West) states: "[Plublic em-
ployees shall have, and shall be protected in the exercise of, the right, freely and with-
out fear of penalty or reprisal, to form, join and assist any employee organization or to
refrain from any such activity ...."
'54 64 N.J. at 581, 319 A.2d at 225, 86 L.R.R.M. at 2842-43, Accord, Pennsylvania
Labor Relations Bd. v. Zelem, Pa. — , 329 A.2d 477 (1974) (statute prohibits
"strict agency shop" provisions).
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Court adopted the lower court's reasoning that such an agreement, by
requiring non-union members to pay the "exact equivalent" of union
members, had the "effect of inducing if not compelling, union mem-
bership, participation and assistance ... . " 155 The lower court, while
expressly acknowledging the statement in North Kingston which sug-
gested that a union security arrangement would be valid if it required
nonmembers to pay the union a sum equal to the actual share of col-
lective bargaining costs,'" did not rule on the validity of such an
agreement,' 57 nor did the Supreme Court in affirming.
In California, a variation of the normal right to refrain statute
has been held to invalidate an agency shop clause in the public sector.
In City of Hayward v. United Public Employees Local 390, 158 the Califor-
nia Court of Appeals recently held an agency shop clause requiring
nonmembers to pay an amount equal to dues illegal in light of certain
provisions of the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA).' 5°. The state
statute was silent as to union security, but gave public employees the
right to refrain and the right to represent themselves individually in
their employment relations with the public agency.'" With respect to
this right to refrain, the court, adopting the same rationale as the
New Jersey court, 1 e' held that an ag ency fee equal to union dues
would induce union membership. 162 The more unusual aspect of the
court's decision lay in its analysis of the effect of amendments to the
state's statute governing public teachers. The court stated that the
statute governing public teachers had recently been amended to sub-
ordinate the right to individual representation where an exclusive
bargaining representative had been recognized and to authorize the
negotiation of agency shop provisions. 163 The court considered this
change as evidence of the fact that when the legislature has wanted to
expand the power of public sector unions, it has done so with explicit
language.'" Therefore, the court concluded that the MMBA did not
authorize the negotiation of union security provisions because there
was no language explicitly granting public sector unions and em-
ployers that power.'" Although viewed by the right to work forces as
155 123 N.J. Super. at 470, 303 A.2d at 604, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2253.
" 6 See tent at note 149 supra.
'" Id. at 469, 303 A.2d at 604, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2253.
16 ' 54 Cal. App. 3d 761, 126 Cal. Rptr. 710, 91 L.R.R.M. 2898 (1st Dist. 1976).
Iso Cu.. Gorr CODE § § 3500-3510 (1966), as amended (Supp. 1976) (West). Sec-
tion 3502 gives public employees the right to form, join and participate in unions, as
well as the right to refrain. It also gives public employees the right to represent them-
selves individually. Section 3506 prohibits employers and unions from interfering, in-
timidating, restraining, coercing or discriminating against public employees because of
an exercise of 3502 rights.
le° CAI.. GOVT CODE § 3502 (1966), as amended (Supp. 1976) (West).
'el See text at note 155 supra.
'°' 54 Cal. App.3d at 767, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 714, 91 L.R.R.M. at 2901.
'" Id. at 767, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 713-14, 91 L.R.R.M. at 2900-01.
" 4 /d. at 766, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 713, 91 L.R.R.M. at 2900.
165 See id. at 768, 126 Cat Rptr. at 715, 91 L.R.R.M. at 2902.
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a major victory against compulsory unionism, the Hayward decision
may be unique because of the court's reliance on the interaction of
California's public teachers' statute and the MMBA. Furthermore, the
California decision, when determining the effect of the statutory right
to refrain, did not discuss the validity of a clause requiring nonmem-
bers to pay a sum equal to the actual cost of collective bargaining.
Union security provisions also have been challenged when a stat-
ute prohibits an employer from discriminating to encourage or dis-
courage union membership and does not contain a provision specifi-
cally authorizing union security provisions. For example, in Smigel v.
Southgate Community School District, 166 the Michigan Supreme Court
held that an agency shop provision requiring nonmembers to pay an
amount equal to dues violated the antidiscrimination provision of the
Michigan Public Employment Relations Act.'" According to the court,
any union security clause which made no effort to relate the economic
obligation of nonmembers to actual collective bargaining expenses, of
necessity either encouraged or discouraged membership in a union.'"
A majority of the justices, however, did not decide whether a union
security provision would be valid if it required payment by nonmem-
bers of' the actual costs of collective bargaining.'"
b. When State Law Authorizesn°
When a jurisdiction has not specifically authorized union security
provisions absent another prohibiting statutory provision, many state
courts have either upheld the challenged union security provision or
have expressed a willingness to endorse an arrangement in which the
service fee charged to nonmembers equals actual costs."' Several
""'388 Midi. 531, 202 N.W.2d 305, 81 I..R.R.M. 2944 (1972). g: Farrigan v.
Helsby, 42 App. Div. 2d 265, 346 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1973).
167 Mien. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.210(I)(c) (1967). At that time, the public sector
law was silent as to union security, although the private sector law, Michigan Labor
Mediation Act, Mum. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.1 et seq. (1967), authorized such provi-
sions. Section 423.14 of the Mediation Act said in part: "Nothing in this act shall he
construed to interfere with the right of an employer to enter into an all-union agree-
ment with one labor organization ...." The public sector law was amended by 1973
Mich. Pub. Acts No. 25, § I, Muat. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.210 (Supp. 1975-76) to au-
thorize service fee arrangements.
168 388 Mich. at 543, 202 N.W.2d at 308, 81 L.R.R.M. at 2955. Accord, Farrigan v.
Helsby, 42 App. Div. 2d 265, 346 N.Y.S.2d 39, 83 L.R.R.M. 3052 (3d Delft 1973) (deci-
sion based on both antidiscrimination and right to refrain clauses).
169 388 Mich. at 541-543, 202 N.W.2d at 307-308, 81 L.R.R.M. at 2954-55. In
1973, the Michigan legislature, reacting to Smigel, expressly authorized the negotiation
in the public sector of a service fee which could be "equivalent to the amount of dues
uniformly required of members." 1973 Pub. Acts No. 25, § 1, Mull. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
423.210 (Supp. 1975-76).
170 Many of.the cases discussed in this subsection of the article also involved chal-
lenges to the use of such fees for "political" purposes. See notes and text at notes
242-57 infra.
17 ' E.g., Tremblay v. Berlin Police Union, 108 N.H. 416, 237 A.2d 668, 68
L.R.R.M. 2070 (1968); Nagy v. City of Detroit 71 L.R.R.M. 2362 (Wayne County Cir.
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states have followed this course legislatively by enacting statutes speci-
fically permitting or mandating the collection of service fees.'" Al-
though the United States Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the
constitutionality of state statutes that authorize the collection of public
sector service fees,'" several state courts have upheld the constitu-
tionality of such provisions and have tended to follow the reasoning
employed by the United States Supreme Court in upholding the valid-
ity of union security provisions negotiated under the National Labor
Relations Act and the Railway Labor Act."' For example, a lower
court in the State of Washington has upheld the constitutionality of a
state statute which required union membership of all bargaining unit
employees, if, after certification of an exclusive representative, a ma-
jority of the bargaining unit employees voted to require such mem-
bership as a condition of employment. 175 In Association of Capitol Pow-
erhouse Engineers v. Division of Buildings and Grounds,'" plaintiffs al-
leged that the statute violated various provisions of the state and
United States constitutions.'" The court held that the statute as ap-
plied did not violate "the requirements for due process, freedom of
speech, freedom of religion, right to assemble, and equal protection
under the law, as guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States
and the Constitution of this state."'" The court did not have to reach
the question of the constitutionality of requiring "actual" membership
in the union because the Washington statute defines "membership" as
"the payment of monthly or other periodic dues ...."'" Thus, the
court was not faced with determining whether such an agreement
created a closed shop, a type of union security outlawed under the
National Labor Relations Act in the private sector.'"
Ct., Mich 1969); North Kingston v. North Kingston Teachers Ass'n, 110 R.I. 698, 297
A.2d 342, 82 L.R.R.M. 2010 (1972). See text at notes 126-70 supra.
172 See notes 87-94 supra. Karchmar v. City of Worcester, 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh.
1223, 301 N.E.2d 570, 84 L.R.R.M. 2410, involved the issue of who could be required
to pay the service fee negotiated pursuant to such a statute. The plaintiffs sought de-
claratory relief to determine if the service fee requirement applied to all bargaining
unit employees or to just the non-civil service employees. The court held that the stat-
ute, and therefore the agreement, was constitutional and that the provision applied to
all employees in the unit, whether civil service or non-civil service. Id. at 1235, 30
N.E.2d at 578, 84 L.R.R.M. at 2416. Based on the reasoning in Karchrizar, a service fee
should apply to all employees, unless the state statute or the specific collective bargain-
ing agreement excludes certain members of the bargaining unit.
"3 The Supreme Court has however, noted probable jurisdiction in a Michigan
case which raises this issue. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 96 S. Ct. 1723 (1976). See
notes and text at notes 182-87 infra.
'"See text and notes at notes 88-91 supra.
WASH.REV. CODE ANN. 41.06.150 (Supp. 1975) (state civil service employees).
Other Washington laws authorize the negotiation of union security provisions for dif-
ferent categories of public employees. See note 94 supra.
'" 92 L.R.R.M. 2748 (Thurston County Super. Ct., Wash. 1976)
'" Id. at 2753.
"8 /d.
"9 /d. at 2751.
199 See text at notes 79-82 supra.
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Other state courts have ruled on the constitutionality of legisla-
tion authorizing the negotiation of public sector union security provi-
sions requiring payment of' a service fee equal to dues. For example,
in 1973, the Michigan Public Employment Relations Act was amended
to authorize collective bargaining clauses requiring "a service fee
equivalent to the amount of dues uniformly required of members of
the exclusive bargaining representative.""81 In A hood v. Detroit Board of
Education,' city teachers challenged this statute. In granting sum-
mary judgment for the defendants, the trial court held that the
amendment in question should be given retroactive effect, thus val-
idating the agency shop clause entered into in 1969."3 In a per curiam
decision, the Michigan Court of Appeals, while reversing and remand-
ing as to the retroactive application of the 1973 amendment,'" sug-
gested that the collection of service fees does not violate the first and
fourteenth amendments as long as the monies collected are used for
collective bargaining purposes. 85 The Michigan Supreme Court de-
In Brenn v. Evans, No. 49998 (Thurston County Super. Ct., Wash., Filed Oct. 8,
1975), a subsequent challenge to the Washington statute, the same court followed its
decision in Capitol Powerhouse. Plaintiffs in Brenn alleged a deep-seated and long held
belief that compulsory unionism in the public sector is wrong and a fear that their em-
ployment would be terminated if they chose not to join the recognized exclusive bar-
gaining representative. The court granted defendants' motion to dismiss.
'8' Micii.Comr. LAWS ANN.* 423.210 (Stipp. 1975-76).
The amendment was occasioned by the decision in Smigel v. Southgate Commun-
ity School Dist., 388 Mich. 531, 202 N.W.2d 305, 81 L.R.R.M. 2944 (1972), which had
interpreted an earlier version of the statute as not authorizing such provisions. See
notes 166-69 supra and accompanying text.
"2 60 Mich. App. 92, 230 N.W.2d 322,90 L.R.R.M. 2152 (1975) (appeal consoli-
dated with Warczak v. Detroit Bd. of Educ.). The plaintiffs in Warczak, Detroit teachers,
filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment on November 7, 1969 challenging the con-
stitutional and statutory validity of the agency shop clause in the collective bargaining
agreement. The history of the lawsuit is summarized in the Michigan Court of Appeals
decision. Id. at 93.94, 230 N.E.2d at 332-24, 90 L.R.R.M. at 2153. The complaint in
Abood is essentially the same as that in Warczak.
'831d. at 94, 230 N.W.2d at 324.90 L.R.R.M. at 2153.
" Id. at 98, 102, 230 N.W.2d at 325, 327,90 L.R.R.M. at 2154, 2156.
Id. at 98-102, 230 N.W.2d at 325-27, 90 L.R.R.M. at 2154-56. Plaintiffs had
also alleged that the use of funds collected under the statutorily authorized agency shop
for noncollective bargaining purposes violated their first and fourteenth amendment
rights. See text at notes 242-57 infra.
On the same day the Michigan Court of Appeals decided Abood, a lower state
court upheld the same Michigan statute. In Ball v. City of Detroit, Civil No. 159-940
(Wayne County Cir. Ct., Mich., filed Mar. 31, 1975), appeal docketed, No, 25586 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1975), the court held that the 1973 amendment did not violate the United
States Constitution, the Detroit City Charter, or the civil service rules. Id. at 48, 51. The
suit was brought in 1970, before the amendment was enacted, challenging an agency
shop clause in a contract between AFSCME and the City. In upholding the Michigan
law, the court stated that the union was entitled to service fees from July, 1973—the ef-
fective date of the amendment. Prior to that date, the negotiated union security clause
was not enforceable in light of Smigel, 388 Mich. 351, 202 N.W.2d 305, 81 L.R.R.M.
2944 (1972).
Apart from the Ball litigation, there is a prior history of legal action regarding
the City of Detroit and the AFSCME agency shop provisions. Ray Nagy, one of the Ball
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nied review of the intermediate appellate court's decision,'" but the
plaintiffs appealed to the United States Supreme Court which has
noted probable jurisdiction in the case.'"
plaintiffs, and others had filed suit in Wayne County Circuit Court against an agency
shop clause entered into in 1968. Nagy v. Detroit, 71 L.R.R.M. 2362 (Wayne County
Cir. Ct., Mich. 1969). See notes 114.16 supra and accompanying text. Due both to this
litigation and to other outstanding injunctions, the defendant union was, from February
1969 until March 1975, totally enjoined from collecting an agency shop fee from the
1,500 to 2,000 nonmembers whom it represented. As a result, AFSCME and its af-
filiates has lost far in excess of $500,000 over the six years. Ball v: City of Detroit, Civil
No. 159-940 at 28 (Wayne County Cir. Ct., Mich., filed Mar. 31, 1975) (Findings of
Fact).
186 395 Mich. 755 (1975).
' 8 ' Probable jurisdiction noted. 96 S. Ct. 1723 (1976).
The Wisconsin statute, Wis. STAT. ANN. § § 111.70 (1)(h), (2) (1974) (West)
(municipal employees), similar to the Michigan law, permits agreements under which
nonmembers are required to pay the union an amount equal to dues. g. WIS. STAT.
ANN. § § 111.80-.97 (1974) (West) (State employees). As in Michigan, the constitutional-
ity of law has been challenged in a series of suits. None of the Wisconsin challenges
have been decided on the merits by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. The Wisconsin stat-
ute was upheld by a Wisconsin circuit court in Gerleman v. Milwaukee Bd. of Educ.,
Civil No. 416-740 (Milwaukee County Cir. Ct., Wis., filed Dec. 27, 1974), reported at
1975 Gorr ENOS.. REL. REP. (BNA), No. 592, B-16. Plaintiff teachers had sought to nul-
lify a service fee arrangement alleging that the statute itself was unconstitutional and
conflicted with other state statutes. Citing a favorable attorney general's opinion, 54 Op.
Att'y Gen. 56 (Wis. 1965), and adopting the reasoning of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in Buckley v. AFTRA, 496 F.2d 305, 86 L.R.R.M. 2103
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1093 (1974),. noted in 16 B.C. INn. & Coat. L. REV. 306
(1975), the Gerleman court rejected the constitutional argument. It stated that even if
government action was involved in the union's requirement that nonmembers pay an
amount equal to dues, the rights of freedom of speech and expression are not absolute.
These rights may be indirectly affected if, as here, there is no "unwarranted abridge-
ment." Civil No. 416-740 at 9. There are legitimate government interests served by
enacting and enforcing such union security provisions sufficient to outweigh any result-
ing interference with the constitutional rights of individual employees. See text at notes
115-19, supra. The court also held that the statute did not violate or destroy the rights
of the teachers as provided in other Wisconsin statutes. Civil No. 416-740 at 4-5. The
provisions relied on by the plaintiffs were Wis. STAT. ANN. § 119.420) (1973) (teacher
tenure); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 63.44 (Supp. 1975-76) (provision for removal not to apply to
certain departments); and Wis. STAT. ANN. § 63.49 (Supp. 1975-76) (no promotion or
demotion for making or failing to make political contributions).
Three other cases are presently pending in Wisconsin state courts. Although the
facts and constitutional objections raised in the three suits differ from those in
Gerleman, the challenged statute is the same. In the first case, Browne v. Milwaukee Bd.
of School Directors, Civil No. 410-584 (Milwaukee County Cir. Ct., Wis., filed May 22,
1973), defendants filed a motion to dismiss which was denied, The Wisconsin Supreme
Court did not rule on the merits, but did affirm the trial court's action. Browne v. Mil-
waukee Bd. of School Directors, 69 Wis. 2d 169, 230 N.W.2d 704, 90 L.R.R.M. 2412
(1975). The case is now before the circuit court awaiting trial. In the second case, John-
son v. Milwaukee Bd. of School Directors, Civil No. 411-578 (Milwaukee County Cir.
Ct., Wis., filed July 19, 1973), a motion to dismiss was denied and responsive pleadings
should be filed soon. In the third, Flood v. Board of Educ., Joint School District No. I,
Village of Menomonee Falls, Civil No. 31180 (Waukesha County Cir. Ct., Wis., filed
May 21, 1974), the Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed the trial court's denial of a
motion to dismiss. Flood v. Board of Educ., Joint School District No. I, Village of
Menomonee Falls, 69 Wis. 2d 184, 230 N.W.2d 711, 90 L.R.R.M. 2053 (1975).
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The Minnesota Public Employment Relations Act,'" unlike the
Michigan law, mandates that a service fee equal to the actual cost of
collective bargaining and contract administration be deducted from
nonmembers' wages at the request of the exclusive representative. In
Robbinsdale Education Association v. Local 872, Robbinsdale Federation of
Teachers,' 8° the Minnesota Supreme Court, reversing the trial court,
held that the service fee statute did' not violate constitutional stand-
ards of procedural due process. The lower court had declared that
the statute violated the Minnesota Constitution and the fourteenth
amendment of the United States Constitution by failing to provide a
procedure to contest the fee prior to its deduction from the salary of
public employees.'" Although neither the service fee provision nor
any other provision of the Minnesota Public Employees Labor Rela-
tions Act'°' specifically provides for a hearing prior to the imposition
of the fee, the Minnesota Supreme Court interpreted the Act to im-
pliedly provide that the public employee has the following due pro-
cess protections:
(a) the right to notice of the amount of an impending fair
share [service] fee which is to be deducted from his earn-
ings; (b) the right to bring an action in district court to en-
join the use of the withheld fee; (c) the right, under certain
exigent circumstances, to have the collection of the fair
share [service] fee enjoined; and (d) the right, in all circum-
stances and upon proper application, to a court hearing on
the validity and proper amount of the fair share [service]
fee. iss
"" MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.65(2) (Supp. 1975) (West). This provision, often re-
ferred to as the fair share proviso of the Minnesota Public Employment Relations Act,
MINN. STAT. ANN. § § 179.61-.77 (Supp. 1975) (West), states inter alia that:
all public employees who are not members of the exclusive representative
may be required by said representative to contribute a fair share fee for
services rendered by the exclusive representative, and the employer upon
notification by the exclusive representative of such employees shall be ob-
ligated to check off said fee from the earnings of the employee and
transmit the same to the exclusive representative. In no instance shall the
required contribution exceed a pro rata share of the specific expenses in-
curred for services rendered by the, representative in relationship to
negotiations and administration of grievance procedures.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.65(2) (Supp. 1975) (West).
189 — Minn. —, 239 N.W.2d 437„92 L.R.R.M. 2417 (1976), U.S. App. Pend-
ing Sub. nom., Threlkeld v. Robbinsdale Fed'n of Teachers, Local 872, 44 U.S.L.W. 3677
(1976).
'°° Id. at — , 239 N.W.2d at 439, 92 L.R.R.M. at 2418.
191 MINN. STAT. ANN. § § 179.61-.77 (Supp. 1975) (West).
182 — Minn. at — , 239 N.W.2d at 441, 92 L.R.R.M. at 2420. In determin-
ing that the statute complied with due process standards, the court examined the con-
flicting state and individual interests. The court concluded that the governmental in-
terest in securing the financial stability of unions out-weighed the individual employee's
interest in obtaining a prior determination of the validity of the fee. Id. at , 239
N.W.2d at 411, 443, 92 L.R.R.M. at 2420-21,
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In the absence of unusual circumstances, the hearing and final judi-
cial determination of the fee's validity could follow the actual withhold-
ing of the fee from nonmembers.'" Although Robbinsdale upheld the
Minnesota statute against an attack on procedural requirements, it did
not dispose of other challenges to the law that had been filed in Min-
nesota state courts,'" and it remains to be seen whether the Act will
withstand a recent, broadly based challenge in federal court alleging
violations of the first, ninth, tenth, thirteenth, and fourteenth
amendments to the United States Constitution.' 95
Thus the courts have generally upheld the collection of service
fees in the public sector. To date, no court appears to have invali-
dated the collection of such a fee where a state statute explicitly per-
mits the negotiation of public sector union security provisions. In-
deed, when such statutes are present, the situation is seemingly no
different than in the private sector where the NLRA and the RLA
permit union security provisions. Such a statute in either sector is a
legislative determination that union security is a useful means of
maintaining labor stability. Since that legislative determination is more
than reasonable and since labor peace, particularly in the public sec-
tor, is a permissible state objective, courts have upheld the collection
of service fees pursuant to such statutes. However, courts have invali-
dated the collection of service fees where a state's public sector bar-
gaining law was silent on the issue of union security. The crucial fac-
tor in such decisions appears to be the presence of state laws, Such as
193 Id. at — , 239 N.W.2d at 444, 92 L.R.R.M. at 2422.
'°' In Beckman v. St. Louis County Bd. of Comm'rs, — Minn. — , 241
N.W.2d 303, 92 L.R.R.M. 2449 (1976), the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the col-
lection of such service fees prior to the amendment to MINN. STAT. ANN. 179.65(2) in
1973 was illegal.
Two other cases, still pending after Robbinsdale, attack the amount of the service
fee established by the union. Litman v. Local 151 and Council 91, AFSCME, Civil No.
407407 (Ramsey County Dist. Ct., Minn., filed Oct. 16, 1975); and Schleck v. Fjone, 88
L.R.R.M. 3525 (Freeborn County Conciliation Ct., Minn. 1975). In Schleck, the union
was sued in a local small claims court by an employee. The court found that the em-
ployee was not given prior notice of the amount of the fee nor given an opportunity to
be heard on the amount of the fee. This portion of the court decision was effectively
overruled by Robbinsdale. The union is attacking the Schleck decision by pursuing its
right to a new proceeding in the county court.
195
 Knight v. Community College Faculty Ass'n, Civil No. 4-74-659 (D. Minn.,
filed Dec. 19, 1974). Plaintiffs motion to convene a three-judge court was denied and as
of this writing plaintiffs are seeking writs of mandamus in the United States Court of
Appeals.
In Hawaii, like Minnesota, there have been attacks challenging the constitutional-
ity of that state's law which automatically grants service fee deductions based on actual
costs to the exclusive representative. HAW. REV. STAT. 89-4 (Supp. 1975). As of this
date, no judicial determination on the merits has been rendered in Hawaii. Motions to
dismiss were granted in Nunn v. Trask, Civil No. 75-231 (D. Hawaii, Filed July 6,
1975), a suit in federal court challenging the constitutionality of the Hawaii union se-
curity law. In a second case, Jensen v. Yonamine, Civil No. 75-405 (D. Hawaii, Filed
Dec. 3, 1975), a group of state teachers filed a complaint against the Board of Educa-
tion, the Hawaii State Teachers Association and others attacking the service fee statute.
A motion to dismiss was filed on February 13, 1976.
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state right to work or civil service laws, which could be violated by the
collection of service fees.
2. Challenges to the Use of Service Fees
In addition to challenging the constitutionality of the collection of
service fees, opponents of unionization have challenged union security
provisions, first in the private and now largely in the public sector, by
attacking the union's use, for political purposes, of these fees. Chal-
lengers have asserted that unions, by using service fees for political
purposes, have infringed upon their constitutional rights by forcing
them to support candidates, parties, and ideologies to which they are
opposed. Unions, in an attempt to forestall such challenges, are now
increasingly adopting internal union rebate procedures to protect the
rights of the dissenter. To better understand the nature of the attack
and the response of unions, it is helpful to discuss first, the political
nature of public employee unions; second, the litigation in both the
private and public sectors; and third, an example of a union rebate
plan in operation.
a. The Political Nature of Public Employee Unions
Challengers to the use of service fees implicitly assume that a
distinction can be drawn between collective bargaining and political
activities. In the private sector, where collective bargaining decisions
are based primarily on market forces, attempts to draw such a distinc-
tion may well be valid. In the public sector, however, collective bar-
gaining decisions affecting wages and working conditions are also
made through the political process,"6 for the public employer's ability
to pay for increased wages and benefits always depends on legislative
actions regarding appropriations and taxes.'" Under some public
employment bargaining statutes the employer immediately involved in
collective bargaining lacks the power to negotiate certain benefits or to
reach final agreement with the union.'" In these situations, collective
bargaining agreements negotiated with the particular union are tenta-
tive in nature and must be presented to the jurisdiction's legislature
for final approval or rejection. To ensure that the employees' interests
receive adequate consideration by legislators, public employees and
'" See Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83 YALE L.J.
1156, 1156-68 (1974) (hereinafter cited as Summers); Anderson, The Impact of Public
Sector Bargaining, 1973 Wis. L. REV, 986, 1005-07.
'" See Summers, supra note 196 at 1162-68. Summers states that: "In the absence
of collective bargaining, the budget-making process ... leaves public employees unable
to protect their interests adequately against those whose interests are opposed." Id. at
1168.
'"E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4330(c) (Supp. 1975); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 1 11.81(16)
(1974) (West) See generally Helburn & Bennett, Public Employee Bargaining and the Merit
Principle, 23 LAB, L.J. 618, 621 (1972).
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their unions may engage in lobbying and political activity.' 99 Indeed,
as one commentator has suggested, "[w]hat the public employee union
is able to do in the legislative halls may often play a more important
role in fashioning the conditions under which its members work and
live than what it is able to do at the bargaining table.” 200
The recent legislative and legal activities of the American Fed-
eration of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) pro-
vide an example of the political nature of public employee unions. On
the local legislative level, AFSCME has sought emergency financial aid
for cities, such as New York, which are in severe fiscal difficulty. In
addition, AFSCME has been involved in other issues arising from
budgetary problems of cities—such as, responding to layoffs, cut-
backs, and subcontracting; and using employee trust funds to aid
localities. On the national level, AFSCME has lobbied in the United
States Congress to extend federal minimum wage laws to public sector
workers 2 01 to establish minimum workplace safety standards, to ex-
tend unemployment compensation to public workers, to improve
health insurance, and to increase the amount of revenue sharing or
other federal monies available to cities, counties and states. Besides
these legislative efforts, AFSCME has also obtained employee protec-
tion not limited to members only, by initiating lawsuits to block the
use of patronage, 202 to prohibit the contracting out of work previously
done by public employees, 203 to seek a more favorable federal tax
I" Blair, supra note 11, at 195.
'" Gromfine, supra note 119, at 298.
Some state public employee relations statutes imply that unions will be actively
involved in legislative efforts. For example, the Minnesota statute authorizes a written
collective bargaining agreement between the employer and the exclusive representative
of the employees; the employer is obligated to "implement the terms of the contract in
the form of an ordinance or resolution. If the implementation of the terms of the con-
tract require the adoption of a law, ordinance, or charter amendment, the employer
shall make every reasonable effort to prepare and secure the enactment of such law,
ordinance, resolution, or charter amendment." MINN. STAT. ANN. 179. 70 (2) (Supp.
1976) (West), Thus, Minnesota public employee unions, in order to secure the advan-
tages won at the negotiating table, will expend funds and engage in lobbying efforts to
bolster the chances of passage of any such bill proposed by the employer.
Besides the above described activities, public employee unions engage in lobbying
to achieve a number of different goals including collective bargaining legislation, non-
negotiable topics and benefits excluded from negotiation by law or tradition (the right
to moonlight), limits on working conditions (maximum working hours per week), and
"end run" lobbying. Moskow, Loewenberg & Koziara, LOBBYING, IN COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING IN GOVERNMENT: READINGS AND CASES 218-20 O. Loewenberg & M. Moskow
eds. 1972).
400 But see National League of Cities v. Usery, 96 S. Ct. 2465 (1976).
"I Illinois State Employee Union, Council 34 v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 928 & 943 (1973) (litigation to reinstate public employees
discharged on the basis of party affiliation or for failure to support the political ac-
tivities of their supervisors); AFSCME v. Shapp, 443 Pa. 527, 280 A.2d 375 (1971)
(litigation to prevent the mass dismissal of state employees in order to allow a newly
elected Democratic Governor to replace the employees with Democrats and party sup-
porters).
"'E.g., Van Buren Pub. School Dist. v. Wayne County Circuit Judge, 90
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ruling on the taxability of certain retirement contributions on behalf
of public employees 2 04 and to protect the rights of institutional work-
ers on the job. 2 °2
Thus, if "political" is defined as "relating to ... the conduct of
government," 206 the entire collective bargaining process in the public
sector would seem to be political in nature, since its outcome will de-
termine the relationship of the particular government employer to its
employees and their union. 207 Consequently, a union is engaged in
"collective bargaining" when it testifies and lobbies on matters that will
benefit all public employees. The same is true when a union acts
within a civil service appeals system or pursues litigation, either di-
rectly or through amicus curiae participation, to secure procedural
rights for employees threatened with disciplinary actions or lay-offs or
to obtain other employee protection. These efforts and the concomi-
tant expenditures of funds and resources are an integral part of im-
proving the working conditions of public employees in every bargain-
ing unit—and of all such employees, not just members of the labor
organization. Consequently, when considering challenges to a public
sector union's use of service fees, courts should distinguish between
political activities which are partisan or ideological and political acti-
vities which are necessary for effective collective bargaining. 208
b. Litigation in the Private and Public Sectors
1. Private Sector. In the words of Mr. Justice Rutledge in United
States v. C/O: 2" "To say that ,labor unions as such have nothing of
L.R.R.M. 2615 (1975); Cunningham v. Community College No. 3, 79 Wash. 2d 793,
489 P.2d 891 (1971); Connecticut Bd. of Lab. Rel., Case No. MPP-26I9 (May 10, 1974),
reported at 1974 Gorr EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA), No. 566, B-13; Connecticut Bd. of Lab.
Rel., Case No. MPP-2605 (Jan. 18, 1974), reported at 1974 GOV'T EMPL. REI.. REP. (BNA),
No. 566, B-13.
104 E.g., Hogan v. United States, 367 F. Supp. 1022 (ED. Mich.) (dismissed),
dismissal affd, 513 F.2d 170 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1975), (litigation to
bring about the exclusion from taxable income for the year in which au individual con-
tributed compulsory public employee contributions to government pension plans).
"'E.g., AFSCME v. Walker, 27 III. App. 3d 883, 327 N.E.2d 568 (1975) (litiga-
tion to require changes in state institution for mental retardates in order to prevent res-
idents from assaulting employees and other residents).
206 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1755 (1961).
107 Blair, supra note 11, at 195-96.
"' Various definitions of "partisan political or ideological" have been suggested.
The AFSCME Judicial Panel recently interpreted "partisan political" as used in the
AFSCME Constitution and stated that the most common meaning of the phrase is that
used in WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1961):
Partisan: "composed of, based upon, or controlled by a single political
party or group."
Political: "of, relating to, or concerned with politics; of, relating to, or in-
volved in party politics."
Judicial Panel Decision No. 74-30, at 6 (Dec. 9, 1975).
222 335 U.S. 106, 144 (1948) (Rutledge, J., concurring). Cf. United States v.
UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 588-89 (1957).
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value to contribute to [the electoral] process and no vital or legitimate
interest in it is to ignore the obvious facts of political and economic
life and of their increasing interrelationship in modern society." A
union that participates in partisan political or ideological activities en-
dorsed by its majority is, except as specifically limited by statute 2 1 °
engaged in a normal and permissible activity. 2 " In political or
ideological activities, as in other areas, the majority of union members
have "an interest in stating [their] views without being silenced by the
dissenters."212 Thus, engaging in these lawful political activites for
which the union spends monies collected from dues and service fees
does not necessarily invalidate union security agreements although
such activites may entitle dissenters to a rebate of a portion of their
service fee or dues.
In the landmark cases of I AM a. Street 213 and Brotherhood of Rail-
way Clerks v. A llen, 2 " the United States Supreme Court considered the
legality of a union's using dues and fees for political and ideological
expenditures objectionable to certain employees. Both cases arose
under the Railway Labor Act. 215 In both cases, railway employees al-
leged that they were required to pay union dues and that a portion of
their dues was used to support political candidates and causes which
they opposed. They requested the courts to enjoin the enforcement of
the union security agreement or to relieve them from the obligation
to pay dues. The Street Court did not decide whether the use of such
money for political purposes was violative of constitutional rights. The
Court held, based on statutory interpretation, that Congress contem-
plated requiring all employees to share the costs of negotiating and
administering collective bargaining agreements and the cost of hand-
ling grievances, but did not intend to provide the unions with a means
of requiring employees, over their objection, to support political
causes which they opPose. 216 The Court refused to invalidate the stat-
ute authorizing the payment of dues or fees, to prohibit the fee
21° E.g., 18 U.S.C. 	 610 (1970), as amended (Supp. V, 1975), which provides in
part:
It is unlawful lily ... any labor organization to make a contribution or ex-
penditure in connection with any election at which Presidential and Vice
Presidential electors or a Senator or Representative in, or a Delegate or
Resident Commissioner to Congress are to be voted for, or in connection
with any primary election or political convention or caucus held to select
candidates for any of the foregoing offices ....
m Section 610, see note 210 supra, has been interpreted by the Supreme Court
and other federal courts. E.g., Pipefitters, Local 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385
(1972); United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567 (1957); United States v. 00, 335 U.S. 106
(1948); and United States v. Boyle, 482 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1076
(1973). See generally notes 196-205 supra and accompanying text.
"2 1AM v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 773 (1961).
" 3 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
414 373 U.S. 113 (1963).
P15 45 U.S.C. 44 151-88 (1970). The specific provision of the Act which was in-
terpreted was the union security provision, 152, Eleventh.
21 BStreet, 367 U.S. at 763-64.
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collection217 or to issue a blanket injunction against all use of the
funds for the disputed purposes."'
In Allen, the Supreme Court did suggest two remedies that
would reconcile the majority and dissenting interests while following
Street's instruction to protect both "to the maximum extent possible
without undue impingement of one on the other."2" The Court indi-
cated that a court could issue a decree ordering a refund of the ex-
acted funds in the proportion that union political expenditures bear
to total union expenditures and a reduction of future exactions by the
same proportion.22° As an alternative to this judicially imposed restitu-
tion, the Allen Court encouraged unions to:
consider the adoption by their membership of some volun-
tary plan by which dissenters would be afforded an internal
union remedy. ... If a union agreed upon a formula for
ascertaining the proportion of political expenditures in its
budget, and made available a simple procedure for allowing
dissenters to be excused from having to pay this proportion
of moneys due from them under the union-shop agree-
ment, prolonged and expensive litigation might well be
averted.22'
The Street and Allen decisions seemingly demonstrate a clear at-
tempt by the United States Supreme Court to create a workable bal-
ance: the minority union member or service fee payor cannot handcuff
the majority of the union if it wishes to engage in partisan political or
ideological activities; on the other hand, neither can the majority com-
pel dissenters to contribute to those activities when their disapproval
and objection is duly noted.222 While Street and Allen directly pertained
only to union security provisions negotiated pursuant to the Railway
Labor Act, other cases have adopted the Street-Allen rationale with re-
spect to such provisions negotiated pursuant to the Taft-Hartley Act.223
2" Street, 367 U.S. at 772. Accord, Allen, 373 U.S. at 119-20. But cf. Ellis v.
Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 91 L.R.R.M. 2339 (S.D. Cal. 1976).
2" Street, 367 U.S. at 772.
mid at 773.
" Allen, 373 U.S. at 122-24; cf., Street, 367 U.S. at 774-75.
221 Allen, 373 U.S, at 122-23. In order to be entitled to any remedy, dissenters
must make their objection known to the union; dissent is not to be presumed. The
union, in justifying any rebate, has the burden of establishing what percentage of its
total expenditures are for partisan political purposes. Id. at 119 8c n.6, 122; Street, 367
U.S. at 771, 774.
m The Supreme Court has treated the judicial complaint as a timely and ade-
quate objection in federal litigation. Allen, 373 U.S. at 119 n.6. See note 250 info.
"3 Seay v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 533 F.2d 1126, 1128 n.3, 92 L.R.R.M.
2063, 2064 n.3 (9th Cir. 1976) (Seay II); Seay, v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 427 F.2d
996, 1003, 74 L.R.R.M. 2600, 2606 (9th Cir. 1970) (Seay I); Reid v. UAW, 479 F.2d
517, 520, 83 L.R.R.M. 2406, 2408 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1076 (1973) (Reid
II); Reid v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 443 F.2d 408, 411, 77 L.R.R.M, 2609, 2612
(10th Cir. 1971) (Reid l).
In addition to these direct attacks on the use of service fees collected pursuant to
the Railway Labor Act and the Taft-Hartley Act, indirect attacks have been made
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In Reid v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. ,224 for example, non-union em-
ployees brought suit against the employer and the UAW challenging
the union's expenditure of monies collected under an agency shop
agreement for the support of political and economic doctrines,
ideologies and legislative programs to which the plaintiffs were op-
posed and which were not reasonably necessary to collective
bargaining. 225 The plaintiffs alleged that by using these monies for
political purposes, the UAW was violating its duty of fair
representation. 2" During the pendency of the litigation, in 1968, the
UAW amended its constitution to provide an internal union rebate
procedure under which dissenters, both union members and agency
fee payors, could obtain a pro rata rebate of monies expended for
"activities or causes primarily political in nature." 227 Subsequently, in
through the Internal Revenue Code and the Labor-Management Reporting and Dis-
closure Act. In Marker v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 1301, 79 L.R.R.M. 3089 (D.D.C.
1972), affd sub nom., Marker v. Schultz, 485 F.2d 1003, 83 L.R.R.M. 3026 (D.C. Cir.
1973), plaintiffs alleged that to the extent that unions engage in political activity, the tax
exemption granted to unions under I.R.C. 501(c)(5), constitutes an indirect subsidy by
the federal government of union political activity and therefore is violative of the dis-
senters' first and fifth amendment rights. 337 F. Supp. at 1302, 79 L.R.R.M. at
3089-90. The suit sought to compel the Secretary of the Treasury to withdraw the tax
exemptions. The District Court For the District of Columbia rejected this indirect at-
tempt to restrain the political actions of unions. Id. at 1304, 79 L.R.R.M. at 3091.
In McNamara v. Johnston, 360 F. Supp. 517, 83 L.R.R.M. 2497 (N.D. III. 1973),
affd, 522 F.2d 1157, 90 L.R.R.M. 2401 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1506
(1976), plaintiffs alleged a breach of the union's fiduciary obligations under 501 (a) of
the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. §
501(a) (1970). Plaintiffs in McNamara claimed, as members of a UAW local union in Il-
linois who paid monthly dues to the union, that the union "unlawfully and wrongfully
diverted a large part of [the membership dues) ... for various political expenditures
and purposes totally unrelated to the interests and welfare of the union and its mem-
bers ...." 360 F. Supp. at 519, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2497. The district court dismissed the
suit because the expenditures in question had been lawfully authorized by the UAW
constitution and the majority vote of the union members. The court held that as a mat-
ter of settled law: "It is clear that political expenditures of union funds which are au-
thorized by its constitution, bylaws, and any pertinent resolution of its governing body
is not within the prohibition of Section 501 of the Act." Id. at 524, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2500.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed and
held that the plaintiffs who objected to the contributions by the union officers could not
sue the officers under the LMRDA. 522 F.2d at 1167, 90 L.R.R.M. at 2408.
224 443 F.2d 408, 77 L.R.R.M. 2609 (10th Cir. 1971) (Reid I). In Reid I, the court
of appeals affirmed the district court dismissal as to the employer, but reversed and
remanded the dismissal as to the union. Id. at 413, 77'L.R.R.M. at 2613.
222 Id. at 409, 77 L.R.R.M. at 2610.
226 Id. See notes and text at notes 67-74 supra.
222 International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Imple-
ment Workers of America (UAW), International Constitution art. 16, 7 (1968), quoted
in Reid II, 479 F.2d at 518 n.1, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2470 n.1, read:
Any member shall have the right to object to the expenditure of a portion
of his dues money for activities or causes primarily political in nature. The
approximate proportion of dues spent for such political purposes shall be
determined by a committee of the International Executive Board, which
shall be appointed by the President, subject to the approval of said Board.
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1972, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ok-
lahoma granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. 228
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in affirm-
ing summary judgment, accepted the UAW rebate review procedure
as negating the allegation of denial of fair representation. 229
Seay v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,'" a companion case to Reid, was
Filed in 1967 against the same employer and against the International
Association of Machinists, AFL-CIO (IAM). Plaintiffs, nonunion em-
ployees of the bargaining unit, again alleged a violation by the union
of its duty of fair representation. The Seay plaintiffs, pursuant to
union security provisions in the collective bargaining agreements ap-
plicable to their bargaining unit, were required to pay to the IAM a
monthly agency fee equal to the monthly dues paid by union
members."' As in Reid, the plaintiffs in Seay claimed that the agency
fees had been used in part to "propagate political and economic doc-
trines, concepts, ideologies, and legislative programs." 2" During the
pendency of the litigation IAM adopted a rebate plan for dissenters
similar to the UAW plan with the exception that the IAM procedure
provides that final appeal for both members and nonmembers is to
The member may perfect his objection by individually notifying the Inter-
national Secretary-Treasurer of his objection by registered or certified
mail; provided, however, that such objection shall be timely only during
the first fourteen (14) days of Union membership and during the fourteen
(14) days following each anniversary of Union membership. An objection
may he continued from year-to-year by individual notifications given dur-
ing each annual fourteen (14) day period.
(b) If an objecting member is dissatisfied with the approximate propor-
tional allocation made by the committee of the International Executive
Board, or the disposition of his objection by the International Secretary-
Treasurer, he may appeal directly to the full International Executive
Board and the decision of the International Executive Board shall be ap-
pealable to the Public Review Board or the Convention at the option of
said member.
Article 6, 20 defines the rights of nonmembers who are agency fee payors. Thus, the
UAW rebated plan provides for review either of the proportional allocation or the dis-
position of the dissident's objection. Review can be taken to the union convention by
members or to a Public Review Board of nonmembers.
228 80 L.R.R.M. 2886 (N.D. Okla. 1972).
22° Reid II, 479 F.2d at 520, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2408. The Tenth Circuit stated:
Plaintiffs, by speculative, conclusionary, and argumentative state-
menu condemn the Union remedy as unfair, unreasonable, and unwork-
able. Those statements do not suffice to create an issue of fact. We have
no concrete particulars to sustain any of the elements which the Supreme
Court says are pertinent to a claim of unfair representation. At the most
the statements are conjectures as to how the union remedy might work in
imagined circumstances..
Id. (citations omitted). Contra, Seay v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 533 F.2d 1126, 92
L.R.R.M. 2063 (9th Cir. 1976) (Seay II).
n° 427 F.2d 996, 74 L.R.R.M. 2600 (9th Cir. 1970) (Stay I).
"' 371 F. Supp. 754, 756, 85 L.R.R.M. 2007, 2007 (C.D. Cal. 1973), mid and
remanded, 533 F.2d 1126, 92 L.R.R.M. 2063 (9th Cir. 1976) (Stay II).
232 It
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the union convention. 233 The district court then dismissed the suit
and held that this self-imposed union rebate plan was "a good faith
effort to comply with Street and Allen. It [was], at least on its face a
fair, reasonable and adequate intra-union procedure "234
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in de-
ciding the appeal of the district court dismissal, stated that the union
security arrangement permitting collection of a service fee equal to
dues was valid. 235 However, the court reversed the summary judg-
ment, saying there was no assurance that the union would continue to
abide by the provisions of its rebate plan once the litigation was ter-
minated. It pointed out that the IAM rebate plan was not instituted
until 12 years after Street was decided and until six years after Seay
was filed. 238 The court remanded the case to the district court for a
hearing on the factual question of whether the union would adminis-
ter the rebate plan fairly. 237 By remanding, the court expressly de-
clined to follow the Tenth Circuit decision in Reid which had held that
the plaintiffs' conclusory statements condemning the UAW rebate
plan as unfair, unreasonable and unworkable were not sufficient to
create an issue of fact. 238
Although the Reid and Seay courts clearly rejected the plaintiffs'
attacks on the concept of internal union rebate procedures, the Seay
decision indicates the possibility of judicial scrutiny of the actual oper-
ation of union plans. Thus, if unions fail to protect the rights of the
protesting dissenter, a court might adopt the second remedy sug-
gested in Allen—the judicial decree.233 Unions, as well as Congress,
233 Machinists Official Circular 669, adopted on June 28, 1973 (effective July I,
1973). The plan was available retroactively to all dues payors, including plaintiffs in
Seay, who notified the union of their objections. Pertinent parts of the plan are repro-
duced in Seay 11, 533 F.2d at 1128-29, 92 L.R.R.M. at 2064-65.
234 371 F. Supp. at 763, 85 L.R.R.M. at 2012.
2" 533 F.2d at 1128 n.2, 92 L.R.R.M. at 2064 n.2.
23° Id. at 1132, 92 L.R.R.M. at 2067.
"' Id. at 1132-33, 92 L.R.R.M. at 2067-68.
239 Id. at 1130 n.6, 92 L.R.R.M. at 2066 n.6. The Reid court, unlike the Seay
court, attached no significance to the fact that the union rebate plan was adopted after
Street was dedded and after the suit by the McDonnell Douglas employees was filed.
479 F.2d at 520, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2408-09. See note 229 supra.
Another recent case, Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 91 L.R.R.M. 2339
(S.D.Cal. 1976), held that the union breached its duty of fair representation by using
fees and dues for noncollective bargaining purposes and activities over the protests of
employees. According to the court, the union further breached its duty by failing to
comply with its own constitutional provisions on dues reductions and by excluding
nonmenbers from eligibility for such reductions. Id. at 2343.
239 In discussing this remedy in Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 122-24 (1963) (emphasis
added), the Court stated:
We recognize that practical difficulties may attend a decree .... The dif-
ficulties in judicially administered relief ... should, we think, encourage
petitioner unions to consider the adoption by their membership of some
voluntary plan .... If a union ... made available a simple procedure for
allowing dissenters to be excused from having to pay this proportion of
moneys due from them . prolonged and expensive litigation might well be
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have long been opposed to the unnecessary intervention of courts into
labor disputes. Indeed, one of the primary purposes behind limiting
the injunctive powers of the federal courts in the Norris-La-Guardia
Act of 19322" was "the proposition that judges were ill-equipped to
pass judgment upon the social and economic issues involved in labor
disputes."2" For this reason, unions are well-advised to adopt union
rebate procedures available to members and nonmembers and to im-
plement these procedures fairly.
2. Public Sector. A series of suits in the public sector, centered in
the states of Michigan and Washington, are attempting to relitigate
the law settled in the private sector •by the Supreme Court in Street
and Allen. The few cases decided by state courts evidence a trend to-
ward adopting the private sector law.242
For example, in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,243 the
Michigan Court of Appeals considered whether monies collected pur-
suant to a service fee provision in a collective bargaining agreement
between a public employer and the union could constitutionally be
used to support political activities opposed by nonmembers."' The
court stated that since the Michigan Public Employment Relations Act
provides for a service fee equal to dues"' and since it can be assumed
that a portion of every union's budget goes to political activities, the
statute sanctions the use of nonmembers' fees for purposes other than
collective bargaining.2" According to the Abood court, the Michigan
law, unlike the Railway Labor Act under consideration in Street247,
could not be construed to deny public sector unions the right, over
employee objection, to use service fees to support political causes op-
posed by the employee.248 In rejecting the statutory approach used
in Street, the Abood court concluded that the service fee clause "could
violate plaintiffs' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights."2" The
court avoided the constitutional issue in the case before it by holding
averted . . The courts will not shrink from affording what remedies they may,
with due regard for the legitimate interests of all parties; but it is:appro-
priate to remind the parties of the availability of more practical alternatives to litiga-
tion for the vindication of the rights and accommodation of interests here involved.
24° 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1970).
' A. Cox & D. BOK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 904 (7th ed. 1969).
842 Although there is no United States Supreme Court decision concerning the
use of service fees by public employee unions for partisan political or ideological pur-
poses, the Supreme Court has noted probable jurisdiction in Abood v. Detroit Rd. of
Educ., 60 Mich. App. 92, 230 N.W.2d 322,90 L.R.R.M. 2152 (1975), probable jurisdiction
noted, 96 S. Ct. 1723 (1976). See notes and text at notes 182-87 supra.
243 60 Mich. App. 92, 230 N.W.2d 322,90 L.R.R.M. 2152 (1975), probable jurisdic-
tion noted, 96 S. Ct. 1723 (1976).
2441d, at 98-99, 230 N.W.2d at 326,90 L.R.R.M. at 2154-55.
2" MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 423.210 (Supp. 1975-76).
24° 60 Mich. App. at 99, 230 N.W.2d at 326,90 L.R.R.M. at 2155.
"I See text at note 216 supra.
248 60 Mich. App. at 99-100, 230 N.W.2d at 326,90 L.R.R.M. at 2155.
"9 Id. at 100, 230 N.W.2d at 327,90 L.R.R.M. at 2156 (emphasis added).
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that none of the plaintiffs had alleged that they specifically protested
the expenditure of funds for political purposes. 25 ° According to the
Michigan Court of Appeals, however, if such a protest had been
made, the remedy suggested in Street and Allen of judicially ordered
restitution25 ' would be the appropriate method to protect the rights
of the dissenter. 252 Thus, the Abood court's finding of a potential con-
stitutional, as opposed to statutory, violation would have no effect on
the remedy ultimately provided dissenters. Both approaches, then,
sustain the non-political uses of service fees.
A Washington court has endorsed the concept of rebate proce-
dures to protect the rights of public sector employees, an approach
similar to the Michigan courts' approval of judicially imposed restitu-
tion or internal union rebate plans as alternative remedies for protect-
ing the rights of nonmembers. In Association of Capitol Powerhouse En-
gineers v. Division of Buildings & Grounds, 253 plaintiffs, who were mem-
bers of the union, brought suit challenging on constitutional grounds
the Washington statute 254 authorizing union security. In upholding
the constitutionality of the statute, the court, while noting that a por-
tion of each service fee went for political purposes, stated that "an eas-
ily accessible procedure has been established for return of that por-
tion, upon application by an employee who disagrees with such utiliza-
tion of funds; and that procedure is publicized in newspapers sent to
each member's residence." 255 Thus, the Washington court, while not
indicating whether the political use of service fees would be a statu-
tory or constitutional violation, has also suggested that the appropriate
255 Id. at 102, 230 N.W.2d at 327, 90 L.R.R.M. at 2156. In their appeal to the
United States Supreme Court, the Abood plaintiffs contend the Michigan Court of Ap-
peals erred in holding that the judicial complaint itself was not a sufficient allegation of
protest. See Petitioner's Jurisdictional Statement at 22-23, Abood v. Detroit Bd. of
Educ., probable jurisdiction noted, 96 S. Ct. 1723 (1976). The Supreme Court in Allen, 373
U.S. at 119 n.6, did treat the judicial complaint as a timely and adequate protest in fed-
eral litigation, but it did not hold that state courts could not require protests directly to
the union as a prerequisite to invoking their judicial machinery.
251 See text at notes 219-21 supra.
252 60 Mich. App. at 102, 230 N.W.2d at 237, 90 L.R.R.M. at 2156.
In Ball v. City of Detroit, Civil No. 159-940 (Wayne County Cir. Ct., Mich. Mar.
31, 1975), appeal docketed, No. 25586 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975), a lower court, unlike the
court of appeals in Abood, construed the Michigan law to deny the union the right, over
an employee's objection, to use the fees to support political causes opposed by the em-
ployee. Id. at 41-43. Notwithstanding the finding that the union in Ball violated the
Michigan Act by using funds exacted from members and service fee payors for certain
political programs, the court held that the statute and the negotiated agency shop
agreement were lawful. The court adopted the Sheet-Allen rationale and held that cer-
tain dissenting employees were entitled to a proportional rebate from the union. Id. at
51-52. While Boll is inconsistent with that part of Aboad that based liability on a constitu-
tional, as apposed to statutory, violation, Ball's remedy appears to be in accord with that
suggested in Abood.
2" 92 L.R.R.M. 2748 (Thurston County Super. Ct., Wash. 1975). See notes and
text at notes 176-80 supra.
254 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 41.06.150 (Supp. 1975) (state civil service employees).
255 92 L.R.R.M. at 2752.
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remedy is the return of a portion of the fee collected.
In the few cases, then, that have discussed the use of dues and
fees by public employee unions for political or ideological purposes,
no state court has yet invalidated a statute authorizing union security
provisions. Rather, the courts have suggested that public sector un-
ions, like their private counterparts, either adopt internal rebate pro-
cedures or be subject to injunctions designed to accommodate the
right of the union to engage in political activity with the right of the
dissenter. Such a result seems logical. The rationale behind the Street
and Allen approach in the private sector is to prevent the majority
from being silenced by the minority. None of the distinctions between
private and public employment warrant granting the minority more
strength in the public sector union. Indeed, the major difference be-
tween the use of service fees in the public and private sectors, one
that the current litigation has not addressed, is what are rebatable,
political expenditures in the public sector. While the distinction be-
tween_ political and collective bargaining expenses is not always clear in
the private sector, 2" the distinction is even more cloudy in the public
2" It is beyond the scope of this article to delineate what are rebatable expendi-
tures. As a federal district court in an early Seay decision noted, it is often difficult to
separate union expenditures germane to collective bargaining from those which are
political or ideological and from which dissenters might receive a rebate.
Quite obviously, this is a difficult question to decide. The Supreme
Court was not called upon to decide it in Street and Allen. Furthermore, I
know of no cases in which lower courts have tried to answer that question.
Therefore, this is a problem that this court needs to face up to.
And just to make a few observations, it seems to me that where the
line is drawn has very serious implications for the activities of the American labor
movement and for thefuture of that movement. It appears to nuithat one would
have to be blind to history not to understand that political activities in a sense
are the blood and sinew of the American labor movement.
In my view, political activities are germane to collective bargaining in
many ways. I think that when labor sits down at the bargaining table with
management, part of each side's bargaining strength is based on its politi-
cal strength, on the legislation under which it operates, and on its political
support in Congress and in State legislatures and in the city councils. This
applies, of course, to both labor and management.
... In a sense, there is an ecological balance that exists in this coun-
try between labor and management. I feel that any case which would have
the effect of seriously disturbing that balance ought to be considered with
great caution and with great deliberation. In a sense, I feel, that balance
has made this country great and strong and prosperous.
IT)his is where I am thinking of drawing the line. Dissenting
employees in an agency fee situation should not be required to support fi-
nancially union expenditures as follows:
One, for payments to or on behalf of any candidate for public office in
connection with his campaign for election to such public office, or
Two, for payments to or on behalf of any political party or organization, or
Three, for the holding of any meeting or the printing or distribution of
any literature or documents in support of any such candidate or political party or
organization. . . .
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sector where union and governmental activities are so closely
associated. 257 Future challenges to the political use of public sector
service fees, therefore, should be directed at distinguishing between
political uses for collective bargaining purposes and political uses for
partisan or ideological purposes.
c. A Union Rebate Procedure in Operation: The AFSCME Plan
The willingness of courts to accept and even to encourage the
use of rebate procedures in the public sector makes it essential for
public sector unions to develop and adopt such plans. The rebate
procedure adopted by the American Federation of State, City, and
Municipal Employees provides a useful example of the provisions
such plans should include. In addition, the AFSCME plan demon-
strates the operation of such a plan.
AFSCME amended its constitution in 1974 to provide for a pro
rata rebate from the International and any involved subordinate body
to dissenters who timely and properly object to expenditures for par-
tisan political or ideological purposes. 258 The plan, available to mem-
bers and nonmembers who have paid dues or a service fee to the
union, provides for review of the amount of the rebate to the Judicial
Panel. If an objector is dissatisfied with the decision of the Judicial
Panel, a further appeal may be taken as follows: (1) members may
appeal to the next International Convention; and (2) nonmembers
may appeal to a Review Panel composed of prominent citizens outside
of AFSCME. 252
Recently, the International Judicial Panel issued its first decision
in an appeal under this provision. 260 The appeal involved a challenge
by ten secretarial employees of the Milwaukee School Board who are'
nonmember service fee payors to AFSCME Local 1053 and Council
48. The AFSCME International Secretary-Treasurer had developed a
method for calculating the rebate, as he is required to do under Arti-
cle IX, Section 9 of the Constitution, and his formula produced a re-
bate of 864 per dissenter for fiscal year 1974. The plaintiffs chal-
lenged the formula and the accuracy of the computation of the rebate
for fiscal year 1974. 26 ' In its decision, the Judicial Panel approved the
method used by the Secretary-Treasurer but found that its application
Now, as to expenditures for other purposes, regardless of their political na-
ture, if that is the proper characterization, I feel that they are sufficiently germane
to collective bargaining to require dissenting employees who are subject to union
shop or agency fee agreements to bear their share of that burden.
Seay v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 371 F. Supp. 754, 761-62 n.7, 85 L.R.R.M. 2008,
2011 n.7 (CD. Cal. 1973), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 533 F.2d 1126, 92
L.R.R.M. 2063 (9th Cir. 1976) (emphasis added).
"' See notes and text at notes 206-08 supra.
25° AFSCME Internad Const. art. IX, § 9.
"° Id.
2 °5 Judicial Panel Decision No. 74-30.
"I Id. at 2-3.
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should have produced an amount increased by 64 per dissenter.2" As
nonmembers, the plaintiffs exercised their right to appeal to the In-
dependent Review Pane1.2" The Review Panel has not yet issued its
decision."4
This example of the AFSCME plan's operation emphasizes the
importance of determining what are rebatable, political expenditures
in the public sector. If the Review Panel sustains the Judicial Panel,
the dissenters will receive a rebate of less than one dollar a year.
Those dissenters motivated by particularly strong principles would
probably seek rebates regardless of the amount actually returned.
Many dissenters, however, would probably feel that a dollar a year
does not justify seeking a rebate. Thus, if a court were to uphold the
union's allocation between collective bargaining expenses and partisan
or ideological expenses, the number of dissenters seeking rebates
would be greatly reduced.
CONCLUSION
As more and more jurisdictions enact public sector bargaining
laws, those who oppose unionization have focused their attack on the
concept of union security and the collection and use of service fees.
Courts have rejected these challenges and upheld union security
clauses and statutes authorizing such provisions. To protect the rights
of the minority without destroying the rights of the majority, some
unions have developed and implemented the concept of rebates to
dissenters who object specifically to the use of service fees for certain
partisan political activites. The right to work forces are financing dis-
sident employee litigation that attacks the operation of union rebate
plans by asserting that unions are not accurately computing rebates
and by alleging that all union expenditures except the direct costs of
negotiating and administering the contract for the particular bargain-
ing unit are rebatable.2" However, courts have found that the scope
of permissible union expenditures that can be charged to service fee
payors is not so narrow. To protect adequately bargaining unit
employees—union members and nonmembers alike—public employee
unions must be involved in the legislative process and must expend
union funds for certain political activities. These activities are not
partisan political or ideological activities, but are efforts that benefit all
bargaining unit employees, that are integral to the process of public
sector collective bargaining, and whose costs should be shared by
2" Id. at 18.
na See text at note 259 supra.
264 The Independent Review Panel hearing was held on March 26, 1976.
"'See, e.g., Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 91 L.R.R.M. 2339, 2342-43 (S.D.
Cal. 1976) (private sector; Railway Labor Act); Ball v. City of Detroit, Civil No. 159-940
(Wayne County Cir. Ct., Mich. Mar. 31, 1975), appeal docketed, No. 25586 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1975) (public sector); Brenn v. Evans, Civil No. 49998 (Thurston County Super.
Cr., Wash. Oct. 8, 1975) (public sector).
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members and nonmembers. Thus, if public sector employees are to
gain the same degree of freedom as their private counterparts, public
sector unions need the financial stability that flows from the enforce-
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